Примеры использования Collective countermeasures на Английском языке и их переводы на Русский язык
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Collective countermeasures.
The deficiencies of such a broad approach to collective countermeasures have already been considered.
There are few instances in which, for example, States from Africa orAsia have taken collective countermeasures.
To disallow collective countermeasures in such cases does not seem appropriate.
For the sake of simplicity, these cases will be discussed under the rubric of"collective countermeasures.
Furthermore,"collective countermeasures" are inconsistent with the principle of proportionality enunciated in article 52.
It should be stressed that this is not a matter of introducing into the draft articles provisions for collective countermeasures.
The rules governing collective countermeasures should be even stricter than those governing bilateral ones.
As noted already,it is appropriate to consider this situation first, before turning to the more complex issues of collective obligations and collective countermeasures.
The draft articles should also include provisions on collective countermeasures taken through international organizations.
Collective countermeasures could be legitimate only in the context of intervention by the competent international or regional institutions.
It was also proposed that the rules governing collective countermeasures should be even stricter than those governing bilateral ones.
As to collective countermeasures in paragraph 2, further efforts should be made to find a way to reduce arbitrariness in the process of their implementation, and to alleviate the influence of the more powerful States.
In particular, the desirability of the newly added article 54 on"collective countermeasures" and the related article 49 needs further consideration.
Furthermore,"collective countermeasures" could provide a further pretext for power politics in international relations.
Caution was also advised since draft article 54 could lead to the taking of multilateral or collective countermeasures simultaneously with other measures taken by the competent United Nations bodies.
Recourse to collective countermeasures must not turn into collective reprisals, in other words action with political aims.
A distinction must be made between bilateral countermeasures, which were an established element of international law,and multilateral or collective countermeasures, which fell within the ambit of the progressive development thereof.
The elimination of the clause on collective countermeasures was a positive development since it constituted a kind of legitimization of collective action.
These provisions would obviously introduce elements akin to"collective sanctions" or"collective intervention" into the regime of State responsibility, broadening the category of Statesentitled to take countermeasures, and establishing so-called"collective countermeasures.
It should be pointed out that rules on collective countermeasures should be even stricter than those on bilateral countermeasures. .
More seriously,"collective countermeasures" could become one more pretext for power politics in international relations, for only powerful States and blocs of States are in a position to take countermeasures against weaker States.
For these reasons, the Special Rapporteur proposes that the Draft articles should allow States parties to a community obligation to take collective countermeasures in response to a gross and well-attested breach of that obligation, in particular in order to secure cessation and to obtain assurances and guarantees of non-repetition on behalf of the non-State victims.
Finally, as"collective countermeasures" further complicates the already complex question of countermeasures, and taking into account the objection to"collective countermeasures" expressed by many States, we suggest that draft articles 49 and 54 in the revised text be deleted entirely.
The same article also provided for countermeasures, andpossibly even collective countermeasures, in cases of serious breaches of essential obligations to the international community as a whole.
It was suggested that collective countermeasures could be legitimate only in the context of intervention by the competent international or regional institutions, and that the situations envisaged in draft article 54 were adequately dealt with under Articles 39 to 41 of the Charter of the United Nations.
It is therefore proposed to alter the position of the Draft articles on the question of collective countermeasures by limiting the extent to which States, not themselves directly injured by a breach of multilateral obligation, can take action by way of countermeasures. .
It was suggested that"collective countermeasures" were inconsistent with the principle of proportionality enunciated in draft article 52, for they would become tougher when non-injured States joined in, with the undesirable consequence that countermeasures might greatly outweigh the extent of the injury.
On these understandings it is proposed, first,briefly to review some examples of recent experience concerned with collective countermeasures as defined, secondly, to attempt an assessment of that practice, and thirdly to consider, in the light of this practice, what provisions ought to be made in the Draft articles.
With regard to individual versus collective countermeasures, it was suggested that the draft articles should also include provisions on collective countermeasures taken through international organizations.