Примеры использования Inadmissible ratione personae на Английском языке и их переводы на Русский язык
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This separate claim against Egypt was thus inadmissible ratione personae.
It claims that the communication is inadmissible ratione personae because the petitioner is not a"victim" for the purposes of article 14 of the Convention.
By submission of 4 April 2002,the State party argues that the communication is inadmissible ratione personae.
The State party concludes that the communication is inadmissible ratione personae under article 14, paragraph 1, of the Convention.
In the absence of any such authorization or exceptional circumstances,the communication accordingly is said to be inadmissible ratione personae.
It submits that the communication is inadmissible ratione personae, loci and materiae.
It concluded that the authors had no standing under article 1 of the Optional Protocol and that,therefore, the communication was inadmissible ratione personae.
The European Court pronounced the application inadmissible ratione personae, on the ground that the heir of Ramón Sampedro was not entitled to continue his complaints.
By submission of 6 April 2004, the State party submits that new counsel in the case has not been authorized by the authors andthat therefore the communication is inadmissible ratione personae.
Firstly, it is said to be inadmissible ratione personae, as held by the European Commission, as a non-custodial parent lacks authority to bring these proceedings.
Thirdly, the author contends that the communication on the name andon behalf of the daughter is not inadmissible ratione personae simply because the father is not a custodial parent.
The State party concludes that the author cannot claim to be a victim within the meaning of article 1 of the Optional Protocol andthat his claim under article 26 is therefore inadmissible ratione personae.
The Committee notes the State party's allegation that the communication is inadmissible ratione personae because the petitioner does not qualify as a victim under article 14 of the Convention.
The Committee concluded that the petitioner could not qualify as a victim since the content of the leaflets had not directly and personally affected her and found, therefore,that the communication was inadmissible ratione personae under article 14, paragraph 1, of the Convention.
The State party requests the Committee to declare the communication inadmissible ratione personae and ratione materiae or, alternatively, should the communication be deemed admissible, to declare it ill-founded.
Turning to the specific recommendations of HREOC(i) to repeal compulsory retirement provisions in the Public Service Act 1922 and other federal legislation, and(ii) to legislate a comprehensive national prohibition on age discrimination,the State party further argues that the allegation is inadmissible ratione personae as the victims are not victims of an alleged failure to take either of these steps.
The State party considers that the communication should be declared inadmissible ratione personae under article 14, paragraph 1, of the Convention because the petitioners are legal persons and not individuals or groups of individuals.
On the question of standing,the Committee notes the State party's contention that the communication should be declared inadmissible ratione personae with respect to Mrs. Burgess and the three children.
It submits that the entire communication is inadmissible ratione personae in so far as it purports to be lodged on behalf of Mrs. Burgess and the Burgess children, as they have not given their authority to act on their behalf.
The authors add that a complaint similar to the one submitted to the Committee was presented in March 1998 to the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights.On 21 October 1999, the Commission informed the authors that their case was inadmissible ratione personae, and that it could not review judicial decisions in which the alleged victim was not an individual but a company.
Case No. 737/1997(Lamagna v. Australia)was declared inadmissible ratione personae, since the alleged violation was committed against the author's company, which had its own legal personality, and not against the author as an individual.
While conceding that the author was not required to exhaust domestic remedies in the light of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on similar cases,the State party argues that his claim under article 26 of the Covenant is inadmissible ratione personae under article 1 of the Optional Protocol and that, in any event, his claims under articles 26 and 2, paragraph 3, of the Covenant are unfounded.
Regarding the State party's argument that the communication is inadmissible ratione personae, the author submits that the power of attorney was included in the submission, and notes that his imprisonment prevented him from submitting the communication personally.
It states that the claim is inadmissible ratione personae, as the author is not the victim of the alleged violation, and ratione temporis, as the confiscation of property took place before the entry into force of the Optional Protocol for the State party.
The State party concludes that the communication should be declared inadmissible ratione personae under article 1 of the Optional Protocol, as the authors have not sufficiently substantiated their claims that they are victims of a violation of the Covenant.
The State party submits that the communication is also inadmissible ratione personae under article 1 of the Optional Protocol, since it failed to address violations by a State party, and argues that it cannot be held responsible for expulsions of members from political parties, as these were freely organized associations under private law.
Firstly, the State party argues the communication is inadmissible ratione personae insofar as it is directed against Sergeant Nicolas Selleres of the Queensland police, the Townsville City Council and the State of Queensland, these parties not being States parties to the Covenant.
The State party upholds that the communication is inadmissible ratione personae, for failure to exhaust domestic remedies and insufficient substantiation, pursuant to articles 1, 2, and 3 of the Optional Protocol; and rules 96(b),(c), and(f) of the Committee's rules of procedure.
The Committee notes the State party's allegation that the communication is inadmissible ratione personae for lack of victim status as the petitioners were neither directly nor indirectly individually subjected to and/or affected by the alleged discriminatory practice of Thai Airways and Thai Travel.
The State party also argues that the complaints should be held inadmissible ratione personae given that the author does not provide any authorization to file a communication on behalf of his son and does not substantiate why his son would have been prevented from filing his own communication.