Примери за използване на Failing institution на Английски и техните преводи на Български
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Ensuring effective resolution of failing institutions within the Union is an essential element in the completion of the internal market.
It should be possible, for reasons of urgency, that the resolution authorities make a rapid valuation of the assets or the liabilities of a failing institution.
In order to deal in an efficient manner with failing institutions, authorities should have the power to impose preparatory and preventative measures.
That tool should be used only in conjunction with other tools to prevent an undue competitive advantage for the failing institution.
A failing institution should be maintained through the use of resolution tools as a going concern with the use, to the extent possible, of private funds.
Such disclosure shall be made only where necessary for reasons of prudential control, andprevention and resolution of failing institutions.
A failing institution should be maintained through the use of resolution tools as a going concern with the use, to the extent possible, of private funds.
That tool should be used only in conjunction with other tools to prevent an undue competitive advantage for the failing institution.
In order to avoid moral hazard, any failing institution should be able to exit the market, irrespective of its size and interconnectedness, without causing systemic disruption.
The right of a party to terminate a contract for reasons other than the mere substitution of the failing institution with the new institution should not be affected either.
The winding up of a failing institution through normal insolvency proceedings should always be considered before resolution tools are applied.
However, in order to ensure that the bail-in tool is effective andachieves its objectives, it is desirable that it can be applied to as wide a range of the unsecured liabilities of a failing institution as possible.
Information concerning the marketing of a failing institution and the negotiations with potential acquirers prior to the application of the sale-of-business tool is likely to be of systemic importance.
However, in order to ensure that the bail-in tool is effective andachieves its objectives, it should be possible to apply it to as wide a range of the unsecured liabilities of a failing institution as possible.
Information concerning the marketing of a failing institution and the negotiations with potential acquirers prior to the application of the sale-of-business tool is likely to be of systemic importance.
However, in order to ensure that the bail-in tool is effective andachieves its objectives, it is desirable that it can be applied to as wide a range of the unsecured liabilities of a failing institution as possible.
Such a restriction would be necessary to allow authorities to obtain a true picture of the balance sheet of the failing institution, without the changes in value and scope that extensive exercise of termination rights would entail.
For the effective application of resolution tools, it is necessary to allow resolution authorities to impose a temporary stay on the exercise by creditors and counterparties of rights to enforce claims and close out, accelerate orotherwise terminate contracts against a failing institution.
Such a restriction is necessary to allow authorities to obtain a true picture of the balance sheet of the failing institution, without the changes in value and scope that extensive exercise of termination rights would entail.
The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive(BRRD) andthe Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation(SRMR), adopted in 2014, set the rules on the recovery and resolution of failing institutions and establish the Single Resolution Mechanism.
The bail-in tool achieves that objective by ensuring that shareholders and creditors of the failing institution suffer appropriate losses and bear an appropriate part of the costs arising from the failure of the institution. .
The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive(BRRD) and the Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation(SRMR) which were adopted in 2014 and which spell out the rules on the recovery and resolution of failing institutions and establish the Single Resolution Mechanism.
A regime is therefore needed to provide authorities with a credible set of tools to intervene sufficiently early and quickly in an unsound or failing institution so as to ensure the continuity of the institution's critical financial and economic functions, while minimising the impact of an institution's failure on the economy and financial system.
As an institution which is wholly or partially owned by one or more public authorities or controlled by the resolution authority,a bridge institution would have as its main purpose ensuring that essential financial services continue to be provided to the clients of the failing institution and that essential financial activities continue to be performed.
Subject to Article 77, Member States shall ensure that resolution authorities have the power to suspend the termination rights of any party under a financial contract with a failing institution that arise solely by reason of an action by the resolution authority, from the notification of the notice pursuant to Article 74(5) and(6) util no later than 5 pm on the business day following that notification.
In that respect, the use of extraordinary public financial support, resolution funds ordeposit guarantee schemes to assist in the resolution of failing institutions should comply with the relevant State aid provisions.
They should include the power to transfer shares in, or assets,rights or liabilities of, a failing institution to another entity such as another institution or a bridge institution, the power to write down or cancel shares, or write down or convert liabilities of a failing institution, the power to replace the management and the power to impose a temporary moratorium on the payment of claims.
In that respect, the use of extraordinary public financial support,resolution funds or deposit guarantee schemes to assist in the resolution of failing institutions should comply with the relevant State aid provisions.
Those should include the powers to transfer shares in, or assets,rights or liabilities of, a failing institution to another entity such as another institution or a bridge institution, powers to write off or cancel shares, or write down or convert debt of a failing institution, the power to replace the management and power to impose a temporary moratorium on the payment of claims.
Notwithstanding paragraph 1, a provisional valuation conducted in accordance with paragraphs 10 and 11 shall be a valid basis for the Board to decide on resolution actions,including instructing national resolution authorities to take control of a failing institution or on the exercise of the write-down or conversion power of relevant capital instruments.