Примери за използване на Interference with the fundamental rights на Английски и техните преводи на Български
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In those circumstances,access to only the data referred to in the request at issue in the main proceedings cannot be defined as‘serious' interference with the fundamental rights of the persons whose data is concerned.
It therefore entails an interference with the fundamental rights of practically the entire European population.
It entails a wide-ranging andparticularly serious interference with the fundamental rights to respect for private life and to the protection of personal data, without that interference being limited to what is strictly necessary.
It follows from the above that Directive 2006/24 does not lay down clear andprecise rules governing the extent of the interference with the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter.
It entails a wide-ranging andparticularly serious interference with the fundamental rights to respect for private life and to the protection of personal data, without that interference being limited to what is strictly necessary.
Therefore, I consider that it must be held that a measure such as that at issue in the main proceedings constitutes an interference with the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter.
Considers that these reforms are crucial in evaluating the effect of the interference with the fundamental rights of privacy and data protection, as set out in Articles 7 and 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights; .
I observe, in that regard, that in its judgment in Digital Rights Ireland and Others(81) the Court stressed the importance of providing‘clear andprecise rules governing the extent of the interference with the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter'.
Directive 2006/24 does not lay down clear andprecise rules governing the extent of the interference with the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles7and 8 of the Charter.
Access to only the data referred to in the request at issue in the main proceedings cannot be defined as‘serious' interference with the fundamental rights of the persons whose data is concerned, as those data do not allow precise conclusions to be drawn in respect of their private lives.
In Digital Rights Ireland the Court stressed the importance of providing‘clear andprecise rules governing the extent of the interference with the fundamental rights enshrined in arts 7 and 8 of the Charter'.
Access to the ETIAS for the purpose of preventing, detecting or investigating terrorist offences orother serious criminal offences constitutes an interference with the fundamental rights to respect for the, in particular with the right to private life of individuals and the right to protection of personal data of persons whose personal data are processed in the ETIAS.
Access to ETIAS for the purpose of preventing, detecting or investigating terrorist offences orother serious criminal offences constitutes an interference with the fundamental rights to respect for the private life of individuals and to the protection of personal data of those persons whose personal data are processed in ETIAS.
Such access also constitutes interference with the fundamental right to the protection of personal data(guaranteed by Art. 8 CFR), as it constitutes processing of personal data;
In addition, the referring court considers that the State's interest in punishing criminal conduct cannot justify disproportionate interferences with the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter.
Likewise, Directive 2006/24 constituted an interference with the fundamental right to the protection of personal data guaranteed by Article 8 of the Charter because it provided for the processing of personal data.
However, as the Court ofJustice has repeatedly stressed, to establish the existence of an interference with the fundamental right to privacy, it does not matter whether the person concerned has suffered any adverse consequences on account of that interference. .
In addition, the Spanish court takes the view that the State's interest in repressing criminal conduct cannot justify disproportionate interferences with the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union(‘the Charter').
In fact, as the Court has already consistently held, the communication of personal data to a third party, such a public authority,constitutes an interference with the fundamental right enshrined in Article 7 of the Charter, irrespective of the use to which the information communicated is subsequently put.
To establish the existence of an interference with the fundamental right to respect for private life, it does not matter whether the information in question relating to private life is sensitive or whether the persons concerned have suffered any adverse consequences on account of that interference(judgment in Digital Rights Ireland and Others, C‑293/12 and C‑594/12, EU: C: 2014:238, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).
Furthermore, I recall that the communication of personal data to a third party, even a public authority such as the police,constitutes an interference with the fundamental right guaranteed in Article 7 of the Charter,(90) including where that information is conveyed for the purposes of a criminal investigation, a situation, moreover, which is expressly referred to in Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58.