Examples of using Condorcet method in English and their translations into Korean
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Colloquial
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Ecclesiastic
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Ecclesiastic
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Programming
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Computer
This is NOT a Condorcet method.
Different Condorcet methods do different things at this point.
This is where the various Condorcet methods differ.
By any Condorcet method, the centrist wins;
Candidate Y, who comes in next-to-last by any Condorcet method, wins by IRV.
Who uses Condorcet methods now?
Condorcet methods are scrupulously unbiased, robust, and reliable.
IRV is NOT a Condorcet method.
By any Condorcet method, the centrist wins; no advantage to anyone.
This candidate is also the Condorcet/Ranked-Pairs winner, therefore, and would win by any Condorcet method.
Who uses Condorcet methods now?
Condorcet methods can be readily implemented with minor disruption, low cost, and major positive effect.
We advocate a voting system known as the Condorcet method for elections between more than two candidates….
His method did not have votersexpress orders of preference; instead, it had a round of voting for each of the possible pairings of candidates… The winner was the alternative that won the most pairings.”- Condorcet Method, Wikipedia.
However, the main concern about the Condorcet method is that it may not produce an undisputed winner.
In any case where we get a first-preference majority(Case 1, and Case 2 centrist-majority variant), the first-preference majority candidate is the Condorcet winner in all cases, and this candidate always wins whether we use FPTP,IRV, or any Condorcet method; no advantage to anyone.
Who uses Condorcet methods now?- Condorcet Canada InitiativeCondorcet Canada Initiative.
No parliament or legislature, or local government currently uses any Condorcet method to elect its members, but.
In all of the different samples that we polled, the Condorcet method not only produced an undisputed winner but usually an entire undisputed order of all the candidates…”- WEB.
If, however, the district elections were doneinstead with Ranked Pairs, or by some other Condorcet method, it would eliminate this concern.
But I would be nevertheless amply content with any other Condorcet method, if it were seen as more likely, and while some of the details would change, such changes would not be exorbitant.
If, however, the district elections were done instead with Ranked Pairs, or by some other Condorcet method, it would eliminate this concern.
Ramon Llull devised the earliest known Condorcet method in 1299.[1] His method did not have voters express orders of preference; instead, it had a round of voting for each of the possible pairings of candidates.
The main reason for our data collection is to see whether the Condorcet method produces an undisputed winner in real life.
All said, then, with the given first- and second-preference assumptions, which most strongly support the original proposition, the proposition fails: while there is demonstrated disadvantage to the centrist in some non-Condorcet votes, there is no advantage whatsoever to the centrist due to either preferential approach,whether IRV, or any Condorcet method.
When there is a Condorcet winner every Condorcet method is as good as every other for identifying this winner.
If there is a Condorcet winner in respect of any given election, every Condorcet method will determine this same winner.
Preferential voting resolves or reduces all of these problems(Condorcet methods, particularly, IRV less so): voters can each vote for their most-preferred candidate, even if the press or the opinion polls say they don't have a prayer, without concern about“wasting” their votes.
If there is a Condorcet winner in respect of any given election, every Condorcet method will determine this same winner.
In the absence of a voter-preference loop in the collective results, all Condorcet methods will determine a winner who most people would acknowledge as the legitimate, true, choice of the majority.