Примеры использования Diversion of nuclear material на Английском языке и их переводы на Русский язык
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That is compounded by the clear possibility of such arrangements leading to the diversion of nuclear material for military purposes.
It is not only a mechanism for ensuring that no diversion of nuclear material or equipment is taking place, but also an essential confidence-building measure.
The IAEA inspectors, who are present during the refuelling, have also recognized that there is no diversion of nuclear material from the reactor.
The IAEA safeguards system,designed to detect and deter the diversion of nuclear material, equipment or nuclear facilities from prescribed purposes, has considerably evolved since the creation of IAEA.
The Vienna Group notes that article III of the Treaty is designed to detect and prevent the diversion of nuclear material, equipment and technology.
The agreed inspection is, in terms of time,an activity of verifying that there has been no diversion of nuclear material since the last inspection but does not include, in terms of contents, activities of verifying the completeness of the initial inventory of nuclear material. .
However, it must be recognized that the IAEA safeguards system remained the core monitoring mechanism for preventing diversion of nuclear material for military purposes.
The Agency's verification mechanism provides a guarantee against the diversion of nuclear material from a declared peaceful use to military purposes and illicit nuclear activity.
Ukraine associates itself with those who stand for further strengthening the Agency andits ability to detect and deter the diversion of nuclear material for non-peaceful purposes.
The fact that during all these years of research there has been no diversion of nuclear material towards prohibited activities is in itself proof of Iran's peaceful intentions.
Delays in the implementation of this verification may have a critical effect on the Agency's ability to conclude that there has been no diversion of nuclear material in the DPRK.
Accordingly, the Agency is unable to draw conclusions as to whether there has been either diversion of nuclear material or reprocessing or other operations at the radiochemical laboratory since February 1993.
The 2010 NPT Review Conference reaffirmed the role of the IAEA in verifying andassuring compliance by States with their safeguards obligations, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful uses.
It can only be concluded that on some points central to the Agency's ability to detect any diversion of nuclear material, including plutonium, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea side permitted itself to disregard commitments made in Vienna.
The Vienna Group of Ten recalls that article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is designed to detect and prevent the diversion of nuclear material, equipment and technology.
It must be understood, however,that the IAEA safeguards system cannot physically prevent the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful to military uses, but merely makes it possible to detect the diversion of material under safeguards or the improper use of facilities that have been placed under safeguards, and to initiate an investigation.
The Conference notes that article III of the Treaty is designed to detect and prevent the diversion of nuclear material, equipment and technology.
At the meeting of the Board of Governors on 11 June 1997, the Director General underlined that the safeguards implementation report for 1996 reported the continuing inability of the Agency to verify the correctness andcompleteness of the initial declaration of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Agency's inability to conclude that there has been no diversion of nuclear material.
The safeguards system needs to be sufficiently robust to provide the international community with a measure of confidence that diversion of nuclear material from safeguarded peaceful uses will be detected promptly.
Against this background, I reported to the Agency's Board of Governors, on 11 June 1997, that the safeguards implementation report for 1996 recorded the continuing inability of the Agency to verify the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea andhence our inability to conclude that there had been no diversion of nuclear material.
In particular, we support efforts to increase access to information andlocations in order to improve the Agency's ability to detect diversion of nuclear material from declared facilities and to provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared facilities.
The Conference notes with concern that IAEA continues to be unable to verify the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration of nuclear material made by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, andis therefore unable to conclude that there has been no diversion of nuclear material in that country.
To conclude safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency for enabling the Agency to verify the fulfilment of their nuclear disarmament obligations,including to prevent further diversion of nuclear material from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and to place under the Agency safeguards fissile materials transferred from military programmes;
The Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference noted with concern that IAEA continued to be unable to verify the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration of nuclear material made by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea(DPRK), andwas therefore unable to conclude that there has been no diversion of nuclear material in that country.
It is a technical instrument in support of the political goal of sustaining an environment in which there can be the peaceful use of nuclear energy without the diversion of nuclear material or the concealment of nuclear material and of nuclear activities directed to nuclear weapons.
In this vein, the questions that continue to be raised now within the framework of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons(NPT) about uranium enrichment and fears of resulting proliferation give us reason to hope that such an instrument could establish multilateral mechanisms and measures that would further ensure the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy andat the same time dispel fears and concerns about the diversion of nuclear material to prohibited uses.
All reports by the IAEA since 2003 have been indicative of thepeaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme, and the Agency has repeatedly reaffirmed that it"has not seen any diversion of nuclear material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices" in Iran's peaceful nuclear programme.
The Vienna Group of Ten(hereafter"the Vienna Group") notes that article III of the Treaty is designed to detect and prevent the diversion of nuclear material, equipment and technology.
We congratulate the Agency not only on addressing its objective of seeking to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world, butalso ensuring that no diversion of nuclear material or equipment is taking place.
Such activities have included: secret, undeclared enrichment activities; secret, undeclared plutonium separation activities;the import of undeclared uranium compounds; and diversion of nuclear material from safeguarded to unsafeguarded locations and uses.