Примери за използване на Exclusivity rebates на Английски и техните преводи на Български
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Computer
I have explained above why there is no separate category of‘exclusivity rebates'.
The Commission argues that‘exclusivity rebates' are inherently different from other pricing practices.
It maintains, in essence, that the present ground of appeal is premised on a fallacy:that‘exclusivity rebates' constitute mere pricing practices.
The grant of exclusivity rebates and payments during such periods is generally capable of restricting competition.
The Commission itself admitted, at the hearing, that, in principle,even‘exclusivity rebates' could be justified by the undertaking in question.
The gist of the approach to the first ground lies in determining the correct legal test to be applied to so-called‘exclusivity rebates'.
With regard to the substantial nature of the effect, the General Court stated that the exclusivity rebates formed part of a single and continuous infringement.
A presumption of unlawfulness applies to loyalty rebates, including(but not limited to)those termed by the General Court as‘exclusivity rebates'.
(16) The General Court considered that rebates belonging to category 3 should be distinguished from‘exclusivity rebates' on the ground that they are not directly conditional on exclusivity. .
Due to the conditional character of the rebates, the General Court classified the rebates andpayments offered by the appellant as‘exclusivity rebates'.
(160) In fact, a point that should not be overlooked is that the‘exclusivity rebates' at issue in the present case(including those granted to Dell) were considered to be de facto conditional on exclusivity. .
The first ground of appeal alleges errors in law in the legal characterisation of rebates termed as‘exclusivity rebates' by the General Court.
The third ground concerns an error in law as regards the classification as‘exclusivity rebates' of certain rebate arrangements that merely covered a minority of a customer's purchases.
The appellant, supported by ACT, submits that the General Court erred in law in classifying the rebate arrangements with HP andLenovo as‘exclusivity rebates'.
In accordance with that methodology,the assumption that‘exclusivity rebates' offered by a dominant undertaking result always, and without exception, in anticompetitive foreclosure permeates the entire judgment under appeal.
Instead, the relevant criterion is, in its view,the overall period during which the appellant applies exclusivity rebates and payments vis-à-vis a customer.
According to the judgment under appeal,‘exclusivity rebates' may hamper market access for competitors of the undertaking in a dominant position, even if access to the market is not economically speaking entirely impossible, but only made more difficult.
I will begin by examining the General Court's findings as regards the implementation in the EEA of the naked restrictions and exclusivity rebates originating from the Lenovo agreements.
Accordingly, in my opinion,the General Court erred in law in considering that‘exclusivity rebates' can be categorised as abusive without an analysis of the capacity of the rebates to restrict competition depending on the circumstances of the case.
In substance, it raises the issue of whether the General Court was right to consider that the rebates offered by the appellant to HP andLenovo could be categorised as‘exclusivity rebates'.
However, the third ground remains significant if the Court were to dismiss the first ground andconsider that‘exclusivity rebates' must be distinguished from other types of loyalty rebates. .
As its primary contention,the Commission argues that the fourth ground of appeal is ineffective since Intel has not contested the finding in the judgment under appeal that the rebates granted to Dell were‘exclusivity rebates'.
Firstly, if it were accepted that‘exclusivity rebates' constitute a distinct category of rebate that ought to be distinguished from other types of rebate schemes that induce loyalty, the underlying assumption of unlawfulness would no longer be open to rebuttal.
First, it considered that the AEC test was irrelevant because, in view of their form,the Commission is not required to demonstrate the foreclosure capability of‘exclusivity rebates' on a case-by-case basis.
Having regard to the above,‘exclusivity rebates' should not be regarded as a separate and unique category of rebates that requires no consideration of all the circumstances in order to determine whether the impugned conduct amounts to an abuse of a dominant position.
Specifically, the General Court found that the rebates granted to Dell, HP, NEC and Lenovo, to which the Commission referred, in particular, in Article 1(a) to(d) of the contested decision,are‘exclusivity rebates' falling within category 2.
I have concluded that the General Court erred in law, first,in finding that‘exclusivity rebates' constitute a separate and unique category of rebates that require no consideration of all the circumstances in order to establish an abuse of a dominant position contrary to Article 102 TFEU.
Taking account of that case-law, the Court must determine the correct legal test to be applied in relation to aparticular category of rebates, which the General Court termed as‘exclusivity rebates' in the judgment under appeal.
(44) To justify that strict approach to‘exclusivity rebates', the General Court considered in the judgment under appeal that the rebates and payments made by Intel were conditional on exclusivity(in a similar, yet not identical manner as in Hoffmann-La Roche, given the lack of a formal exclusivity obligation).
Intel contends, in essence, that, because the exclusivity requirement attached to those rebates related to certain segments of the requirements for CPUs of those OEMs,the classification of the rebates in question as‘exclusivity rebates' is wrong in law.