Примери за използване на Occupational requirement на Английски и техните преводи на Български
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This was not a genuine occupational requirement.
It noted that only in very limited circumstances can characteristic related to religion constitute a genuine and determining occupational requirement.
When general fitness is an occupational requirement, as for athletes, soldiers, and police and fire personnel, aerobic exercise alone could not supply a well balanced exercise system.
Therefore, this is not a real occupational requirement.
The Court pointed out that there are very limited circumstances in which a characteristic related to religion can constitute a genuine and determining occupational requirement.
(23) It is clear that such a profession of belief does not constitute, in this case, an occupational requirement, much less one that is genuine and justified.
It was only in very limited circumstances that a characteristic related, in particular,to religion in general might constitute a genuine and determining occupational requirement.
When all round fitness is an occupational requirement, as for athletes, soldiers, and police and fire personnel, aerobic workout alone might not provide a effectively balanced exercise plan.
The European Court of Justice remarked that only in very limited circumstances can a characteristic regarding religion constitute a genuine and determining occupational requirement.
Moreover, respect for the concept of marriage according to the doctrine andcanon law of the Catholic Church is not a genuine occupational requirement since it does not appear necessary because of the importance of IR's occupational activity, namely the provision of healthcare services, for the manifestation of IR's ethos or the exercise by IR of its right of autonomy.
The Court of Justice underlined that only in very limited circumstances may a characteristic such as religion orbelief constitute a genuine and determining occupational requirement.
The question raised in the present case is whether respect for the concept of marriage under the doctrine and canon law of the Catholic Church constitutes a genuine,legitimate and justified occupational requirement, within the meaning of Article 4(2) of Directive 2000/78, which can entail a difference of treatment, in terms of dismissal, between Catholic employees and those who belong to another faith or to none at all.
It went on to say that only in very limited circumstances could a characteristic, specifically one relating to religion,constitute a genuine and determining occupational requirement.
(18) In very limited circumstances, a difference of treatment may be justified where a characteristic related to racial orethnic origin constitutes a genuine and determining occupational requirement, when the objective is legitimate and the requirement is proportionate.
According to the Court, it is only in very limited circumstances that a characteristic related, in particular,to religion may constitute a genuine and determining occupational requirement.
Thus, the differentiating criterion at issue does not involve a‘characteristic' which is‘related to any of the grounds referred to in Article 1[of Directive 2000/78]' andconstitutes‘a genuine and determining occupational requirement' in accordance with the conditions for the application of Article 4 as defined by the Court's case-law.
The ECJ was quick to point out that it is only in very limited circumstances that a characteristic, relating in particular to religion,may constitute a genuine and determining occupational requirement.
To my mind, such a recruitment policy would be clearly incompatible with the first subparagraph of Article 4(2)of Directive 2000/78 because religion could not be classified as a genuine and justified occupational requirement for jobs linked to the provision of healthcare services, for the reasons I have just given.
Allows only limited exceptions to the principle of equal treatment(only where a difference in treatment on the grounds of race orethnic origin is a genuine and determining occupational requirement);
Thus the lawfulness, in the light of that provision, of a difference of treatment ongrounds of religion or belief depends on the objectively verifiable existence of a direct link between the occupational requirement imposed by the employer and the activity concerned.
Allows for limited exceptions to the principle of equal treatment, for example in cases where a difference in treatment on the ground of race orethnic origin constitutes a genuine occupational requirement.
The question sent from the French Court of Cassation was whether a customer's wish to not have services provided by someone wearing an Islamic headscarf“may be considered a‘genuine and determining occupational requirement' within the meaning of the directive.”.
The Directive provides that, in some circumstances,a difference in treatment that would otherwise amount to discrimination may be removed from its scope if the difference is based on a characteristic which constitutes an“occupational requirement”.
Shall not constitute discrimination where, by reason of the nature of the particular occupational activities concerned or of the context in which they are carried out,such a characteristic constitutes a genuine and determining occupational requirement, provided that the objective is legitimate and the requirement is proportionate.“.
The court found that the willingness of an employer to take account of the wishes of a customer no longer to have its services provided by a worker wearing an Islamic headscarf cannot be considered a"genuine and determining" occupational requirement within the meaning of the directive.
However, in the absence of such a rule,the willingness of an employer to take account of the wishes of a customer no longer to have the employer's services provided by a worker wearing an Islamic headscarf cannot be considered an occupational requirement that could rule out discrimination.
Indeed, the Court has held that‘the lawfulness from the point of view of that provision of a difference of treatment on grounds of religion… depends on the objectively verifiable existence of a direct link between the occupational requirement imposed by the employer and the activity concerned.
Therefore, the CJEU concluded that the willingness of an employer to take account of the wishes of a customer to no longer have services provided by a worker wearing an Islamic headscarf could not be considered to be a genuine and determining occupational requirement within the meaning of the Directive.
The answer given by the Court is, therefore, that the willingness of an employer to take account of the wishes of a customer no longer to have the services of that employer provided by a worker wearing an Islamic headscarf cannot be considered a genuine and determining occupational requirement within the meaning of the directive.
The French Court of Cassation asked whether the willingness of an employer to take account of the wishes of a customer no longer to have that employer's services provided by a worker wearing an Islamic headscarf may be considered a“genuine and determining occupational requirement” within the meaning of the directive.