Примери за използване на To restrictive effects на Английски и техните преводи на Български
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Colloquial
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Official
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Medicine
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Ecclesiastic
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Ecclesiastic
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Computer
Standard terms can give rise to restrictive effects on competition by limiting product choice and innovation.
More generally, unless it takes place in a tight oligopoly,the exchange of aggregated data is unlikely to give rise to restrictive effects on competition.
Therefore, this information exchange could give rise to restrictive effects on competition within the meaning of Article 101(1).
When entering a market is sufficiently easy,a horizontal co-operation agreement will normally not be expected to give rise to restrictive effects on competition.
However, even ifthe standards led to restrictive effects on competition, the conditions set out in Article 101(3) would seem to be fulfilled.
In that case an assessment is required as to whether the agreement is likely to give rise to restrictive effects on competition within the meaning of Article 101(1).
Sharing of strategic data can give rise to restrictive effects on competition because it reduces the parties' decision-making independence by decreasing their incentives to compete.
Because of the likely anti-competitive foreclosure downstream, this agreement is likely to give rise to restrictive effects on competition within the meaning of Article 101(1).
This can lead to restrictive effects on competition if actual competition in the incumbent's market is already weak and the threat of entry is a major source of competitive constraint.
In those situations the issue of joint exploitation may only give rise to restrictive effects on competition where foreclosure from key technologies plays a role.
A market share above that threshold in one or both markets does not automatically indicate that the joint purchasing arrangement is likely to give rise to restrictive effects on competition.
A third channel through which information exchange can lead to restrictive effects on competition is by increasing the external stability of a collusive outcome on the market.
Agreements falling outside the R&D Block Exemption Regulation because the combined market share of the parties exceeds 25% do not necessarily give rise to restrictive effects on competition.
Generally, a production agreement is more likely to lead to restrictive effects on competition in a concentrated market than in a market which is not concentrated.
There is no absolute threshold above which it can be presumed that an R&D agreement creates or maintains market power andthus is likely to give rise to restrictive effects on competition within the meaning of Article 101(1).
Analysis: This standardisation agreement is likely to give rise to restrictive effects on competition within the meaning of Article 101(1) and is unlikely to meet the criteria of Article 101(3).
In either of the two situations mentioned above, it is likely, in the market configuration of this example, that the production joint venture of Companies A andB would give rise to restrictive effects on competition within the meaning of Article 101(1) on the market of X.
A production agreement is unlikely to lead to restrictive effects on competition if the parties to the agreement do not have market power in the market on which a restriction of competition is assessed.
This co-operation is likely to increase the risk of a collusive outcome andthereby likely to give rise to restrictive effects on competition within the meaning of Article 101(1).
Whether a production agreement is likely to give rise to restrictive effects on competition depends on the situation that would prevail in the absence of the agreement with all its alleged restrictions.
There is no absolute threshold above which it can be presumed that the parties to a joint purchasing arrangement have market power so thatthe joint purchasing arrangement is likely to give rise to restrictive effects on competition within the meaning of Article 101(1).
A production agreement can give rise to restrictive effects on competition if it involves an exchange of commercially strategic information that can lead to a collusive outcome or anti-competitive foreclosure.
As set out in paragraph 132,pure R&D agreements will only rarely give rise to restrictive effects on competition within the meaning of Article 101(1).
Provided that the standard does not have negative effects on the downstream market(for example by excluding certain installers through very specific and unjustified requirements for installations)it is not likely to lead to restrictive effects on competition.
Consequently, joint advertising or joint promotion agreements can also give rise to restrictive effects on competition if those costs constitute a significant cost factor.
Joint purchasing arrangements may lead to restrictive effects on competition on the purchasing and/or downstream selling market or markets, such as increased prices, reduced output, product quality or variety, or innovation, market allocation, or anti-competitive foreclosure of other possible purchasers.
Whether the exchange of information in the context of a production agreement is likely to lead to restrictive effects on competition should be assessed according to the guidance given in Chapter 2.
However, the information exchange would give rise to restrictive effects on competition within the meaning of Article 101(1) because knowing the competitors' actual current prices would be likely to facilitate coordination(that is to say, alignment) of companies' competitive behaviour.
In general, however,R&D co-operation concerning entirely new products is unlikely to give rise to restrictive effects on competition unless only a limited number of credible alternative R&D poles exist.
Even if the exchange creates some risk of giving rise to restrictive effects on competition, the efficiency gains stemming from increasing supply to places with high demand and decreasing supply in places with low demand is likely to offset potential restrictive effects. .