Примери коришћења Matruh на Енглеском и њихови преводи на Српски
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It is served by Mersa Matruh Airport.
Matruh was 120 mi(190 km) east of the Libyan border.
The British resumed observation andthe 7th Armoured Division prepared to challenge an attack on Mersa Matruh.
Using supplies captured at Tobruk,on the frontier and Mersa Matruh, the Panzerarmee reached El Alamein on 30 June.
Reconnaissance Unit 3 went on to Bardia anda composite force was sent on to Sollum to try to reach Mersa Matruh.
Small deliveries could be made to Tobruk,Bardia and Mersa Matruh or be landed at Tripoli and Benghazi, 1,300 and 800 mi(2,100 and 1,300 km) distant.
Only the desert-worthy vehicles could be risked off-road,which left tanks unable to move far from Matruh.
Small deliveries could be made to Tobruk,Bardia and Mersa Matruh or be landed at Tripoli and Benghazi, 2,100 and 1,300 kilometres(1,300 and 800 mi) distant.
Wells were dug but most filled with salt water andin 1939 the main sources of fresh water were Roman aqueducts at Mersa Matruh and Maaten Baggush.
At Matruh an infantry force would await the Italian attack, while from the escarpment on the desert flank, the bulk of the 7th Armoured Division would be ready to counter-attack.
Panzerarmee Afrika advanced into Egypt after the victory at Gazala in pursuit of the Eighth Army,which made a defensive stand at Mersa Matruh.
Operation Compass, a British counter-attack on an Italian advance on Matruh was planned to destroy the Italian force and most of the WDF was moved up to the port.
Despite prodding from Mussolini, the Italians dug in around Sidi Barrani and Sofafi,about 80 mi(130 km) west of the British defences at Mersa Matruh.
The war was fought primarily in the Western Desert, which was about 240 miles(390 km) wide,from Mersa Matruh in Egypt to Gazala on the Libyan coast, along Litoranea Balbo(Via Balbia), the only paved road.
The 10th Army advancedabout 65 mi(105 km) into Egypt but made contact only with British screening forces of the 7th Support Group(7th Armoured Division) not the main force around Mersa Matruh.
By 16 September,the Italian force had advanced to Maktila, around 80 mi(130 km) west of Mersa Matruh, where they halted due to supply problems.
The 10th Army advanced about 65 mi(105 km)into Egypt but only made contact with the British screening force of the 7th Support Group(7th Armoured Division) and did not engage the main force around Mersa Matruh.
The 7th Armoured Division less the 7th Armoured Brigade, assembled at Mersa Matruh and sent the 7th Support Group forward towards the frontier as a covering force, where the RAF also moved most of its bombers; Malta was also reinforced.
A British raid, Operation Compass(Battle of Marmarica/Battle of the Camps),began when Selby Force advanced from Matruh to isolate Maktila early on 9 December.
The WDF with about 30,000 men, advanced from Mersa Matruh in Egypt on a five-day raid against the positions of the 10th Army, which had about 150,000 men in fortified posts around Sidi Barrani and further west, over the border in Cyrenaica.
To counter the Italian advance, Wavell ordered his screening forces to harass the advancing Italians,falling back towards Mersa Matruh, where the main British infantry force was based.
The ground moves began when Selby Force(Brigadier A. R. Selby)of 1,800 men from the Matruh garrison(the largest group which could be carried by lorry), advanced from Matruh to cut off Maktila to prevent the garrison from reinforcing the Tummars.
The number of vehicles available in 1939 was inadequate and lorries were diverted to provide the Armoured Division with a better rear link; only the desert-worthy vehicles could be risked off-road,which left tanks unable to move far from Matruh.
Before dawn on 18 November, Eighth Army launched a surprise attack,advancing west from its base at Mersa Matruh and crossing the Libyan border near Fort Maddalena, some 50 miles(80 km) south of Sidi Omar, and then pushing to the north-west.
The Support Group, with three motorised infantry battalions, artillery, engineers and machine-gunners, was to harass the Italians andto fight delaying actions between the border and Matruh if attacked but to retain the capacity to engage the main Italian force.
The Italian invasion of Egypt(13- 18 September),began as a limited tactical operation towards Mersa Matruh, rather than for the strategic objectives sketched in Rome, due to the chronic lack of transport, fuel and wireless equipment, even with transfers from the 5th Army.
The 8th Army launched its surprise attack beforedawn on 18 November, advancing west from its base at Mersa Matruh and crossing the Libyan border near Fort Maddalena, some 50 miles(80 km) to the south of Sidi Omar, and then pushing to the north-west.
Reconnaissance Unit 3 went on to Bardia anda composite force was sent on to Sollum to try to reach Mersa Matruh but was prevented by the British Mobile Force(Brigadier William Gott) on the frontier, which conducted a delaying action around Sollum and Capuzzo.
Preparations were made in the strictest secrecy and only a few officers knew during the training exercise heldfrom 25- 26 November, that the objectives marked out near Matruh were replicas of Nibeiwa and Tummar and that the exercise was a rehearsal; the troops were told that a second exercise was to follow and many did not know that the operation was real until 7 December, as they arrived at their start positions.