Ví dụ về việc sử dụng Senkakus trong Tiếng anh và bản dịch của chúng sang Tiếng việt
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Throughout 2015, the Chinese dispatched newly commissionedcoast guard vessels of over 3,000 tons to the Senkakus.
Use of straight baselines to enclose the Paracels and Senkakus is also inconsistent with UNCLOS.
But China saw it as a provocation and sent vessels andaircraft to challenge Japan's control of the Senkakus.
China's real intention is to get closer and closer to the Senkakus and to use their strong presence to bolster their claims.
To that end, China is building up a military base in theNanji Islands about 300 km west of the Senkakus.
The MSDF has regularly deployed P-3C patrol planes anddestroyers in the sea around the Senkakus, known as the Diaoyus in Chinese, to monitor and keep in check Chinese ships.
Beijing is also trying to take apart another island nation, Japan, by pressuring East China Sea islands that Tokyo administers andcalls the Senkakus.
The most serious Chinese response was the dispatch of unarmed China Marine Surveillance(CMS)ships to the Senkakus where they were ordered to conduct“routine monitoring.”.
According to CIRO, China has greatly increased unilateral oil and gas development near the line separating Chinese andJapanese waters near the Senkakus.
A more China-centric deployment plan, especially with the Senkakus and Ryukyu islands in mind, could see more forward deployments into the East China Sea and Sea of Japan.
According to CIRO, China has greatly increased unilateral oil and gas development near the line separating Chinese andJapanese waters near the Senkakus.
Recently, the Chinese government sent bigger, stronger patrol ships-- almost equivalent with naval combatant ships--into the waters around the Senkakus," said Hideaki Kaneda, a retired vice-admiral now with the Ozaki Institute in Tokyo.
In 1969 a survey conducted under the auspices of the United Nations determined that there were potentially large oil andgas deposits in the seabed surrounding the Senkakus.
Hours later,as Japanese forces begin operations to remove the Chinese nationals from the Senkakus, Beijing fires a warning shot, a DF-21D or“carrier-killer” missile which hits the ocean just 10 miles away from the Japanese task force.
Japan's rationale in establishing the outpost, as with most of its recent strengthening efforts, is that sooner orlater China will try to take the Senkakus by force.
With China holding the 19th Party Congress and Japan organizing a snap election in late October,an incident around the Senkakus could have introduced unwelcome and difficult to control dynamics at a politically sensitive time for both countries.
With the underlying claims unchanged, and both sides determined to continue their activities around the islands,tensions around the Senkakus are likely to spike again.
This oscillation, which has been going on for the past few years,could explain why last week's naval incursions near the Senkakus were described by Tokyo as larger than usual, and why Japanese are now saying that Sino-Japanese relations are rapidly deteriorating.
Both the U.S. and Japan long assumed that the biggest threat was the new Chinese Zubr air cushion craft that could get troops andvehicles to the Senkakus in five hours.
Japan's protests occurred after incursions by as many as 230 Chinese fishing vessels andsix coast guard ships in contiguous zones surrounding the Senkakus on Saturday, and intrusions by two Chinese coast guard vessels into the territorial waters around the islets on Sunday.
The island, which the Japanese government paid for, will be used as Japan's new military base, in its determination to protect the Diaoyu Islands,which Japan calls the Senkakus.
According to Jonathan Miller, an international affairs fellow with the Council on Foreign Relations,China's behavior near the Senkakus is likely meant to press Tokyo, which has been vocal in its support of the tribunal's decision, while also actively supporting maritime capacity building among rival claimants in Southeast Asia.
In April 2012, Shintaro Ishihara, the nationalist governor of Tokyo,announced he would purchase and develop the Senkakus in order to protect Japanese sovereignty.
A few hundred miles to the north of the Philippines, China is virtually in a showdown with Japan over a small and until recently obscure group of barren islands androcks known in Japanese as the Senkakus.
But in an age of quick sound bites and rabid social media, can such interests be articulated so thatAmericans would be prepared to die for the Senkakus, a reef, or even a hard-to-articulate international order?
Although Japan has drawn straight baselines along parts of its mainland coast, several of which the United States views as excessive,Japan has not asserted any excessive maritime claims in the waters around the Senkakus.
An incident flared in September when a Chinese fishing trawler apparently rammed two Japanese coastguard vessels in waters near some uninhabited islets(called the Senkakus in Japan and the Diaoyus in China).
Of course Australia's support for Japan in the East China Sea only goes so far, whereas US president Barack Obama reiterated in April that the US, as part of the security treaty,would come to Japan's aid in the event of a conflict over the Senkakus.
Abe could instead join forces with the party of ultra-right wing political maverick Ishihara Shintaro, the outspoken former governor ofTokyo who this year provoked Japan to nationalize the Senkakus, inciting protests across China.