Exemple de utilizare a To disapply în Engleză și traducerile lor în Română
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In particular, is it required to disapply that national provision when deciding a case between private parties?
In order to ensure the effectiveness of the fight against fraud affecting the financial interests of the Union,the Court therefore asked the national courts, if need be, to disapply those provisions.
If that is indeed the case,the national court is not obliged to disapply the provisions of the Criminal Code at issue.
You chose arbitrarily to disapply those rules- you did not seek to change them, which would have required a certain amount of time, you simply disregarded them.
That interpretation would allow the national court to avoid that obligation, in that it requires the national court to disapply the limitation rules at issue in the proceedings pending before it.
In the present case,by requiring the national courts to disapply in the proceedings pending before them the limitation rules at issue, the Court seeks to guarantee that objective in compliance with Article 49 of the Charter and in keeping with the scope afforded to the principle enshrined in Article 7 of the ECHR that offences and penalties must be defined by law.
Key policy areas addressed within the ECN included the ability of NCAs,in their application of Articles 81 and 82 EC, to disapply anticompetitive State measures(following the CIF ruling(122) by the European Court of Justice).
(2) The Court of Justice lacks jurisdiction to rule on the compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights of a requirement of Swedish law pursuant to which there must be‘clear support' in order for national courts to disapply a domestic provision.
(13) In view of the specific conditions on certain Alpine routes,it may be appropriate for a Member State to disapply a user charge system from a well defined section of its motorway network in order to permit application of an infrastructure related charge;
Since the Italian legal order confers a higher standard of protection of fundamental rights than that arising from the interpretation of Article 49 of the Charter and Article 7 of the ECHR, the Corte costituzionale(Constitutional Court)adds that Article 53 of the Charter therefore authorises the national courts to disapply the obligation laid down by the Court in the judgment in Taricco and Others.
It notes in this respect that, in paragraph 53 of the judgment,it is stated that, if the national court decides to disapply the provisions of the Criminal Code at issue, it must also ensure that the fundamental rights of the persons concerned are respected.
If national law cannot be applied in such a way as to comply with the requirements of Article 5a(3), a national court ortribunal which would be competent to hear appeals against decisions of the national regulatory authority if it was not prevented from doing so by a provision of national law which explicitly excluded its competence has the obligation to disapply that provision. 20.
Key policy areas addressed within the ECN included the ability of NCAs, in their application of Articles 81 and 82 EC, to disapply anti-competitive State measures(following the CIF ruling122 by the European Court of Justice).
The Corte costituzionale(Constitutional Court) maintains that, by requiring the national court to disapply the provisions laid down in the last subparagraph of Article 160 and the second subparagraph of Article 161 of the Penal Code in proceedings pending before it, thus extending the applicable limitation period, the obligation identified by the Court in the judgment in Taricco and Others is at variance with that principle.
Whereas transactions carried out on a bullion market regulated by a Member State require further simplifications in their tax treatment because of the huge number and the speed of such operations;whereas Member States are allowed to disapply the special scheme,to suspend tax collection and to dispense with recording requirements;
The competent national courts,for their part, when they have to decide in proceedings before them to disapply the provision of the Criminal Code at issue, are required to ensure that the fundamental rights of persons accused of committing criminal offences are observed(see, to that effect, judgment in Taricco, paragraph 53).
According to the referring court, those rights would not be observed if the provisions of the Criminal Code at issue were disapplied in the proceedings pending before it, in so far as, first,the persons concerned could not reasonably foresee before the delivery of the Taricco judgment that that Article 325 TFEU requires the national court to disapply those provisions in the circumstances set out in that judgment.
However, in the event of conflicting provisions,the general principle of primacy of EU law requires national courts to disapply any provision of national law which contravenes an EU rule, regardless of whether that national law provision was adopted before or after the EU rule.
In the light of that case-law, I think it is perfectly logical that the Court considered in Mangold that the fact that the time-limit for the transposition of Directive 2000/78 had not expired could not undermine the effectiveness of the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age and, in order to ensure that effectiveness,the national court had to disapply provisions of national law which were contrary to Community law.
By its second question, the referring court essentially asks whether a national court is required,in a dispute between individuals, to disapply a provision of national law which it is not possible to interpret in conformity with Article 4(2) of Directive 2000/78.
(1) Is Article 325(1) and(2)TFEU to be interpreted as requiring the criminal court to disapply national legislation on limitation periods which precludes, in a significant number of cases, the punishment of serious fraud affecting the financial interests of the European Union, or which imposes shorter limitation periods for fraud affecting the financial interests of the European Union than for fraud affecting the financial interests of the State, even where there is no sufficiently precise legal basis for such disapplication?
By the first part of its second question, the referring court essentially asks whether, under EU law, a national court is required,in a dispute between individuals, to disapply a provision of national law that cannot be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with the second subparagraph of Article 4(2) of Directive 2000/78.
According to the principles identified by the Court in the judgment in Taricco and Others, the national court is required,if need be, to disapply the combined provisions of the last subparagraph of Article 160 and the second subparagraph of Article 161 of the Penal Code in the proceedings pending before it, in order to ensure, in accordance with Article 325 TFEU, that an effective penalty is imposed in respect of the fraud which has been found to exist.
In the context of the main proceedings, the Corte costituzionale(Constitutional Court) maintains that the individuals concerned could not reasonably foresee, on the basis of the legal framework in place at the material time, that EU law, andin particular Article 325 TFEU, would require the national court to disapply the last subparagraph of Article 160 and the second subparagraph of Article 161 of the Penal Code, thus extending the applicable limitation periods.
Second, according to the referring court, the national court would not be able to define the particular circumstances in which it would have to disapply those provisions, namely where they prevent the imposition of effective and deterrent penalties in a significant number of cases of serious fraud, without exceeding the limits imposed on its discretion by the principle that offences and penalties must be defined by law.
Through its case-law, the Court of Justice has identified an obligation on administrations and national courts to apply EU law in full within their sphere of competence andto protect the rights conferred on citizens by that law(direct application of EU law), and to disapply any conflicting national provision, whether prior or subsequent to the EU provision(primacy of EU law over national law).
According to the principles identified by the Court in the judgment in Taricco and Others,the national courts are required to disapply the provisions of the last subparagraph of Article 160 and the second subparagraph of Article 161 of the Penal Code if they prevent‘the imposition of effective and dissuasive penalties in a significant number of cases of serious fraud affecting the financial interests of the European Union'.
In the context of the present reference for a preliminary ruling, the Corte costituzionale(Constitutional Court, Italy) asks the Court about the extent to which the national courts are required to fulfil the obligation, identified by the Court in the judgment of 8 September 2015,Taricco and Others,(2) to disapply, in pending criminal proceedings, the rules in the last subparagraph of Article 160 and the second subparagraph of Article 161 of the codice penale(‘the Penal Code').
European Union law precludes a judicial practice which makes the obligation for a national court to disapply any provision contrary to a fundamental right guaranteed by the Charter conditional upon that infringement being clear from the text of the Charter or the case-law relating to it, since it withholds from the national court the power to assess fully, with, as the case may be, the cooperation of the Court of Justice, whether that provision is compatible with the Charter.
The possibility thus given to the national court by the second paragraph of Article 267 TFEU of asking the Court for a preliminary ruling before disapplying the national provision that is contrary to European Union law cannot, however,be transformed into an obligation because national law does not allow that court to disapply a provision it considers to be contrary to the constitution unless the provision has first been declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court.