Examples of using Weapon-usable in English and their translations into Arabic
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There are no indications that Iraq otherwise acquired weapon-usable nuclear material.
This declaration included some nuclear material which was not weapon-usable but did not include much larger amounts of other non-weapon-usable nuclear materials which had been clandestinely acquired or produced.
There are no indications that Iraq otherwise acquired weapon-usable nuclear material.
(a) Systems in which plutonium and other weapon-usable materials are never separated from spent fuel, the radioactivity of which deters proliferation and diversion efforts;
A commitment to adopt/maintain the necessary measures for security, control and accounting of weapon-usable materials.
Without question, improving control of facilities capable of producing weapon-usable material would go a long way towards establishing a better margin of security.
Many initiatives are in progress tohelp countries improve the physical protection of this weapon-usable nuclear material.
The goal must be tocreate a safeguards regime that extends to all nuclear weapon-usable material in all countries, the nuclear-weapon States included, backed up by physical control arrangements.
This places extra emphasis on the importance of controlling access to weapon-usable nuclear material.
Nonetheless, it must be recognized that Iraq 's direct acquisition of weapon-usable material would present a serious technical challenge to OMV measures, and great reliance must continue to be placed on international controls.
The threat of terrorism alsosuggests that we should contemplate the inclusion of certain weapon-usable materials of somewhat lower purity.
His delegation,which had first proposed a prohibition on the further production of weapon-usable fissile material in 1979, called for the early conclusion within the Conference on Disarmament of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
Although the safeguards system was available to prevent proliferation,extra care was required when dealing with weapon-usable material.
For those who are serious about wantingto achieve nuclear disarmament, banning the production of weapon-usable fissile material is, like the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, an essential, not optional, step.
They are mutually reinforcing and even help to reduce the risks of nuclear terrorism-- for example,by strengthening controls over weapon-usable fissile materials.
There are no indications of Iraq having retained any physical capability for the indigenous production of weapon-usable nuclear material in amounts of any practical significance, nor any indication that Iraq has acquired or produced weapon-usable nuclear material other than the nuclear material verified by IAEA and removed from Iraq in accordance with paragraph 13 of resolution 687(1991).".
There are no indications that there remains inIraq any physical capability for the production of amounts of weapon-usable nuclear material of any practical significance.
He stated that such consideration shouldinclude an evaluation of the merits of limiting the use of weapon-usable material(high enriched uranium and plutonium) in civilian nuclear programmes, by permitting it only under multilateral control, and that any exploration of this kind had to be accompanied by appropriate rules of transparency, control and, above all, assurance of supply of nuclear fuel cycle services.
I have previously pointed out to the Security Council the serious challenge that would face the ongoing monitoring andverification plan of IAEA if Iraq were to acquire weapon-usable nuclear material directly.
The members of the Commission took note of the latest report of the Director General of IAEA(S/1997/779 of 8 October) that, inter alia,there are no indications that any weapon-usable nuclear material remains in Iraq and that the ongoing monitoring and verification activities of IAEA have not revealed indicators of the evidence in Iraq of prohibited materials, equipment or activities.
These choke points were uranium enrichment at a level where weapon usability came into focus, and reprocessing-the process by which plutonium became weapon-usable in a physical sense.
As previously recorded, there are no indications of Iraq having retained any physical capability for the indigenous production of weapon-usable nuclear material in amounts of any practical significance, nor any indication Iraq has acquired or produced weapon-usable nuclear material other than the nuclear material verified by IAEA and removed from Iraq in accordance with paragraph 13 of resolution 687(1991).
These activities have provided the basis for IAEA ' s statement that there are no indications of Iraq havingretained any physical capability for the indigenous production of weapon-usable nuclear material in amounts of any practical significance.
Given these new challenges, we believe that the time has come to envisage a new internationalnon-proliferation regime which would limit the processing of weapon-usable nuclear material in civilian nuclear programmes, control the production of new nuclear material by enrichment, administer the disposal of fuel and radioactive waste and, finally, ban the production of fissile material for military use with a view to beginning the reduction of nuclear weapons.
Pending the commencement of negotiations on a fissile materials cut-off treaty, the five nuclear-weapon States should utilize the forum of the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons review process to issue ajoint statement announcing a moratorium on the production of weapon-usable fissile material.
Furthermore, these efforts tend to emphasize demand-driven proliferation,namely the possible quest for NEDs or NWs or weapon-usable nuclear materials, by state and non-state actors, such as terrorists.
In its report of 27 July 1998(S/1998/694, para. 35), the Agency States that:" As previously recorded, there are no indications of Iraq having retained any physical capability for the indigenous production of weapon-usable nuclear material in amounts of any practical significance, nor any indication Iraq has acquired or produced weapon-usable nuclear material other than the nuclear material verified by IAEA and removed from Iraq in accordance with paragraph 13 of resolution 687(1991).".
The results of the IAEA ' s on-site inspection of Iraq ' s nuclear capabilities have, over time, produced a picture of a very well-funded programme aimed at the indigenous development andexploitation of technologies for the production of weapon-usable nuclear material and the development and production of nuclear weapons, with a target date of 1991 for the first weapon.
Numerous difficulties remain, however, in defining the nuclear terrorist threat, given the hundreds of confirmed cases ofnuclear smuggling(some involving small amounts of weapon-usable materials), as well as significant uncertainties about the status of such materials in States that are known to possess nuclear weapons.
In March 2004, in his statement to the IAEA Board of Governors, the Director General referred to the wide dissemination of the most proliferation-sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle- the production of new fuel,the processing of weapon-usable material and the disposal of spent fuel- as the possible" ' Achilles ' heel ' of the nuclear non-proliferation regime", and to the importance of tightening control over such operations.