Примеры использования Producing fissile на Английском языке и их переводы на Русский язык
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Colloquial
Prompt conclusion of a ban on producing fissile material for use in nuclear explosives.
We expect verification to focus on facilities that are producing orare clearly capable of producing fissile material.
In order toreduce nuclear stockpiles, one must first stop producing fissile material, the key ingredient of nuclear weapons.
Producing fissile materials still remains the critical obstacle to overcome in any new nuclear weapon programme and for any country seeking to increase its nuclear arsenal.
The nuclear-weapon States have reportedly stopped producing fissile material for use in weapons.
FMCT verification will focus on such facilities, and therefore the treaty will require a definition that includes facilities that are producing orclearly capable of producing fissile material.
I can confirm that the United Kingdom will maintain the moratorium on producing fissile material for nuclear weapons in the meantime.
Other states producing fissile material would have to implement additional safeguards measures covering the stocks and production facilities of fissile material as defined by the Treaty, and declare production facilities.
Zero: France no longer has any nuclear testing facilities or facilities producing fissile materials for nuclear weapons.
In addition, the United States had stopped producing fissile materials for nuclear explosives, and had launched a new global effort to halt their production anywhere in the world.
It can at least constrain the nuclear-weapon States or any State from producing fissile materials for nuclear weapons.
Importantly, it will bring all nuclear facilities capable of producing fissile material for use in weapons in all States, including the NPT nuclearweapon States, under legallybinding international verification.
On 18 April 1995,United Kingdom Foreign Secretary Hurd announced that the United Kingdom had stopped producing fissile material for explosive purposes;
It will bring all nuclear facilities capable of producing fissile material for use in nuclear weapons under legally binding international nuclear safeguards.
We welcome the moratorium declared by four nuclear States parties to the NPT to refrain from producing fissile material for nuclear weapons.
In practical terms,what should be done if there is agreement is to stop producing fissile material and to place any other nuclear installations that produce such material under a safeguards regime.
At the same time, the procedures andtechnical means of verification should be adequate to enable detection of undeclared facilities producing fissile materials for prohibited purposes.
The United States had stopped nuclear testing and producing fissile material for nuclear weapons more than seven years earlier.
One of the principal characteristics of such an international instrument must be its non-discriminatory nature in the sense that a uniform regime for strict international verification should be applied to all States andto all facilities capable of producing fissile material in all States without exception.
In an exemplary and unprecedented manner, France dismantled its facilities for producing fissile material to be used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons.
In the view of the Netherlands,the basic elements of such a treaty could include a ban on producing fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, a ban on acquiring fissile material for weapons and on transferring it to third countries, a ban on converting fissile material for civilian purposes for use in weapons and a requirement that States parties to the treaty disable, decommission and, where feasible, dismantle their fissile material production facilities for weapons, or reconfigure them.
Our suggested verification approach would be based on monitoring facilities capable of producing fissile material and any newly produced fissile material.
While awaiting the end of these negotiations,Switzerland supports the principle requiring States producing fissile material for military purposes to observe a moratorium on production of such material and place it under IAEA controls.
The main undertakings in a“cut-off” convention would be: to terminate production operations and to refrain from any further production of fissile materials intended for explosive devices;to refrain from providing assistance in producing fissile materials for proscribed purposes to any other State, and to accept non-discriminatory international safeguards to verify these undertakings.
The disappearance of the land component of the nuclear force, the closure and dismantling of the nuclear research centre in Mururoa and the closure anddismantling of factories producing fissile materials for nuclear-weapon use are major decisions on the path towards the implementation of our commitments under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons NPT.
Some nuclear-weapon States had announced that they had ceased production of fissile materialfor use in weapons, and it urged all States capable of producing fissile material for weapons purposes to declare a moratorium on production pending the conclusion of a legally binding fissile material cut-off treaty in the Conference on Disarmament.
France today no longer has facilities that produce fissile material for nuclear weapons.
France no longer produces fissile material for use in nuclear weapons.
The United States has not produced fissile material for weapons purposes for over 15 years.
It should also cover all newly produced fissile material.