Приклади вживання Moscow may Англійська мовою та їх переклад на Українською
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But Moscow may have more ambitious goals.
Proceeding from this,the most likely options for further actions by Washington and Moscow may be as follows:.
What Moscow may eventually accept is the partitioning of Syria.
Although we should not ruleout that due to certain compromise agreements between Russia and the United States, Moscow may“surrender” B. Assad.
He added that Moscow may be attempting to depose the democratic government in Georgia.
And the most interesting thing about this situation is thatthe“Turkish Stream” remains extremely questionable, and Moscow may not even get one“gas pipe”….
Washington and Moscow may well deploy additional NOCs and illegals to help bear the load.
He also saidhe was reviewing Russia and Ukraine's 1997 friendship treaty- a hint that Moscow may no longer respect Ukraine's sovereign borders.
In addition, Moscow may use an additional 120,000 military from the Western Military District, including tank troops, to“attack.”.
At the same time, according to Armenian experts,in case of a threat to Russia's interests in Armenia, Moscow may use military force to protect them.
But Moscow may be most piqued by inclusion of two non-NATO members, Finland and Sweden, who work closely with the alliance.
Undoubtedly, in order to destabilize the situation in the neighboring country, Moscow may use the powerful presence of Russian banks in the banking system of this country.
In addition, Moscow may be on the cusp of becoming, once again, a full-fledged imperial capital, absorbing and ruling over multiple countries.
In the context of thefact that Ukrainian Orthodoxy can get Tomos from Constantinople to create autocaphalia, Moscow may decide on certain provocations in this region.
In Washington admit that Moscow may try to exert pressure on political processes in the United States, as is the case with other countries.
We are gravely concerned about the aggressive posture of Russian forces along the eastern border of Ukraine,as well as reports that Moscow may be making threatening moves towards allies in the Baltics.
Moscow may well continue to enable the separatists to attack Ukrainian forces along the line of control for months or even years.
It opens up the possibility, hitherto remote, that Washington and Moscow may find common cause in easing out Bashar al-Assad and defusing the rebellion against the Damascus regime.
Moscow may return Crimea to Ukraine just as it has returned independence to the three Baltic States, despite their recognition as Soviet republics for a long time.
By investing and exerting influence in Iran's energy sector, Moscow may seek to ensure that Iran's energy riches will not be exported in such a way as to directly compete with Russia.
In the wake of the recent alleged poisoning in England of former Russian spy Sergei Skripal- and the alleged 2004 poisoning of Ukrainian presidential candidate Viktor Yushchenko-it is possible that Moscow may return to this deadly option as well.
Officials worry that Moscow may try to use its submarines to cut or tap into undersea cables that connect the two continents.
A"punishment" on the part of the Kremlin for unilaterallyblocking the channel of shadow communication in Kyiv and Moscow may be a slowing down of the dialogue on the release of Ukrainian prisoners, including the Navy's navy.
There is deep apprehension that Moscow may invade eastern and southern Ukraine, pressing west to Transdniestria, and also seek land grabs in the Baltics.
Like the impending sale of the advanced S-300 air defense system to Iran, it has the effect of limiting U.S. options andinfluence at a time when Moscow may calculate that Washington is unlikely to respond sharply.
But some Western diplomats in Kyiv fear Moscow may float proposals that would stop short of guaranteeing Ukraine's sovereignty, all the while increasing the onus on Kyiv to deliver on the divisive political aspects of Minsk.
In particular, if under the present circumstances a technical default of the Russian banking system is expected before the end of this year,in case of Russia's attempts to capture Mariupol, Moscow may lose all its gold reserves in four or five months.
So, taking into consideration transformation of the risks for the Russian economy from the effects of the West's current range of sector sanctions into real threats to its economic security, already in 2015,the official Moscow may face problems of loyalty of the Russian oligarchy and persistent deficit of financial and human resources, accelerated depreciation and withdrawal of basic funds, gradual degradation of infrastructure and magistral communications.
While the Senate's desire to punish Russia for its election meddling, its war on Ukraine and its poisoning of a former Russian spy in Britain is understandable,Medvedev's comments indicate that Moscow may see the imposition of dollar sanctions as crossing red line.
It is possible that Moscow might dare to take extreme measures- military actions.