Примери за използване на Standardisation agreements на Английски и техните преводи на Български
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Effects based assessment for standardisation agreements.
Standardisation agreements frequently give rise to significant efficiency gains.
The following considerations apply to all standardisation agreements that depart from the principles as set out in paragraphs 280 to 286.
Standardisation agreements may produce their effects on four possible markets, which will be defined according to the Market Definition Notice.
Two key features of the reform are a new chapter on information exchange in the Horizontal Guidelines anda substantial revision of the chapter on standardisation agreements.
Standardisation agreements produce their effects on three possible markets, which will be defined according to the Commission notice on market definition.
In general, depending on the competition issues‘environmental agreements' give rise to, they are to be assessed under the relevant chapter of these guidelines, be it the chapter on R&D, production,commercialisation or standardisation agreements.
Standardisation agreements which do not restrict competition by object must be analysed in their legal and economic context with regard to their actual and likely effect on competition.
The Horizontal Guidelines provide an analytical framework for the assessment of the most common types of horizontal co-operation agreements such as research and development agreements, production agreements, purchasing agreement, commercialisation agreements and standardisation agreements.
To achieve those efficiency gains in the case of standardisation agreements, the information necessary to apply the standard must be effectively available to those wishing to enter the market(126).
Standardisation agreements have as their primary objective the definition of technical or quality requirements with which current or future products, production processes, services or methods may comply(95).
Where participation in standard-setting, as well as the procedure for adoptingthe standard in question, is unrestricted and transparent, standardisation agreements which set no obligation to comply with the standard and provide access to the standard on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms do not restrict competition within the meaning of Article 101(1).
Standardisation agreements usually produce significant positive economic effects(102), for example by promoting economic interpenetration on the internal market and encouraging the development of new and improved products or markets and improved supply conditions.
Participation in standard-setting is unrestricted andthe procedure for adopting the standard in question is transparent, standardisation agreements which contain no obligation to comply with the standard and provide access to the standard on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms will normally not restrict competition within the meaning of Article 101(1)[TFEU]”.
Standardisation agreements can cover various issues, such as standardisation of different grades or sizes of a particular product or technical specifications in markets where compatibility and interoperability with other products or systems is essential.
Moreover, the chapter gives detailed guidance on standardisation agreements that do not fulfil the safe harbour criteria, to allow companies to assess whether they are in line with EU competition law.
Whether standardisation agreements may give rise to restrictive effects on competition may depend on whether the members of a standard-setting organisation remain free to develop alternative standards or products that do not comply with the agreed standard(118).
The Guidelines also provide- albeit limited- guidance on those standardisation agreements that do not fulfill the safe harbour criteria, in order to allow companies to self-assess whether they are compliant with EU competition law.
As the effectiveness of standardisation agreements is often proportional to the share of the industry involved in setting and/or applying the standard, high market shares held by the parties in the market or markets affected by the standard will not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the standard is likely to give rise to restrictive effects on competition.
As a general rule standardisation agreements should cover no more than what is necessary to ensure their aims, whether this is technical interoperability and compatibility or a certain level of quality.
In a similar vein, standardisation agreements that entrust certain bodies with the exclusive right to test compliance with the standard go beyond the primary objective of defining the standard and may also restrict competition.
Standardisation agreement without IPR disclosure.
The standardisation agreement should in that case include adequate safeguards to mitigate possible risks to competition resulting from exclusivity.
In the absence of market power(110), a standardisation agreement is not capable of producing restrictive effects on competition.
The assessment of each standardisation agreement must take into account the likely effects of the standard on the markets concerned.
Whether a standardisation agreement affords the parties the possibility of eliminating competition depends on the various sources of competition in the market, the level of competitive constraint that they impose on the parties and the impact of the agreement on that competitive constraint.
The assessment of each standardisation agreement must take into account its likely effect on the markets concerned, on the one hand, and the scope of restrictions that possibly go beyond the objective of achieving efficiencies, on the other(127).
Analysis: This standardisation agreement is likely to give rise to restrictive effects on competition within the meaning of Article 101(1) and is unlikely to meet the criteria of Article 101(3).
Restrictions that go beyond what is necessary to achieve the efficiency gains that can be generated by a standardisation agreement or standard terms do not fulfil the criteria of Article 101(3).
Efficiency gains attained by indispensable restrictions must be passed on to consumers to an extent that outweighs the restrictive effects on competition caused by a standardisation agreement or by standard terms.