Examples of using Completeness of the initial declaration in English and their translations into Russian
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Official
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Colloquial
IAEA continued to be unable to verify the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
In the case of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea(DPRK), the information and access provided to us have been and remain insufficient for acomprehensive picture of the nuclear programme, and questions remain about the completeness of the initial declaration of nuclear activities.
However, it is even more worrisome that the IAEA has not been able so far to carry out its Security-Council-mandated activities in Iraq orto provide assurances regarding the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
We are, however, concerned at the report of the obstacles which continue to be placed in the Agency's path as it attempts to carry out its assigned task of verifying the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration of nuclear material by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
We believe that North Korea should relinquish its nuclear ambitions and readmit IAEA inspectors as soon as possible so as tofinally enable the Agency to verify the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration of nuclear material made by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
Verification of the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear material is to be carried out following consultations between IAEA and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea when a significant portion of the Light Water Reactor project is completed, but prior to the delivery of key, nuclear-related components;
It is worrying that the IAEA is still unable to verify the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration of nuclear material made by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
Verification of the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear material was to be carried out following consultations between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and IAEA when a significant portion of the Light Water Reactor project foreseen in the"Agreed Framework" was completed, but prior to the delivery of key nuclear components.
To enable the Agency to verify the accuracy and completeness of the initial declarations of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, it is also essential that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea take all steps that may be deemed necessary by the Agency to preserve, intact, all information relevant to such verification.
Against this background, I reported to the Agency's Board of Governors, on 11 June 1997,that the safeguards implementation report for 1996 recorded the continuing inability of the Agency to verify the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and hence our inability to conclude that there had been no diversion of nuclear material.
Generic parameters for the verification regime-- such as how to ensure the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration; how to guarantee sufficient assurances from routine inspections; how to detect undeclared activities; how to protect sensitive information in the framework of verification; how to ensure cost-effectiveness and cost efficiency; and how to create a verification system that can respond flexibly to technological progress-- are among the issues we discussed.
At the meeting of the Board of Governors on 11 June 1997,the Director General underlined that the safeguards implementation report for 1996 reported the continuing inability of the Agency to verify the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Agency's inability to conclude that there has been no diversion of nuclear material.
In our view, such parameters are as follows, and I name six: first,how to ensure the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration; second, how to guarantee sufficient assurance from routine inspections; third, how to detect undeclared activities and ensure the effectiveness of inspections; fourth, how to protect sensitive, namely, confidential information in the framework of verification; fifth, how to ensure costeffectiveness and cost-efficiency; and sixth, how to create a verification system that can respond flexibly to technological progress.
While the Agency has been able to verify the freeze,it continues to be unable to verify the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration of nuclear material by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and hence unable to conclude that there has been no diversion of nuclear material.
Paragraphs 13 to 14 of that report coverthe remaining issues addressed, in particular as relevant to the preservation of information required to verify the correctness and completeness of the DPRK's initial declaration under its Safeguards Agreement.
Moreover, my letter referred to a detailed technical paper, which was given to the DPRK at the outsetof the September talks, about the preservation of information which the Agency needs for verifying the correctness and completeness of the DPRK's initial declaration.
No progress was made on any of the key technical issues outstanding, particularly the important issue of the preservation of information relevant to verifying the accuracy and completeness of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's initial declaration.
At the meeting on 7 June 1999,I also noted that the Agency's Safeguards Implementation Report for 1998 recorded the continuing inability of the Agency to verify the correctness and completeness of the DPRK's initial declaration of nuclear material and, therefore, our inability to conclude that there has been no diversion of nuclear material.