Примеры использования Nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive на Английском языке и их переводы на Русский язык
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The other is a ban on fissile material production for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.
There are no nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices deployed on the territory of Ukraine under its jurisdiction.
Confirm that the stockpile of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices has not increased;
There is no explanation in the glossary about the contents of the uranium isotope or the plutonium isotope to be categorized as material for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.
Confirm that the amount of stock of fissile material for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices has not increased from the date an FMCT enters into force.
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We also believe that an FMCT must be a treaty for banning the future production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.
All fissile material used to produce nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices should be placed under an updated comprehensive Agency safeguard mechanism.
The basic objective of this treaty is to prohibit the future production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.
Designing, developing, or fabricating nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices; or devising, carrying out, or evaluating nuclear tests or nuclear explosions.
However, advances in weapon technology may enable a lower quality of fissile material to be used for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.
It urges countries of the Middle East to refrain from producing,acquiring or possessing nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices; to also refrain from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territories by any third party; and to agree to place their nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.
An FMCT must also recognize that there are legitimate civilian andmilitary uses for fissile materials other than nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.
The first is to confirm that the amount of stocks of fissile material for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices has not increased since the date an FMCT entered into force.
One of the core issues of the negotiations would be what would be included in the scope of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.
First, regarding core obligations, there is a consensus that a ban on the future production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices would be the core obligation of an FMCT.
I should also make clear that Australia does not believe that an FMCT should proscribe the production of fissile material per se,only the production for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.
Before examining the definition of fissile materials for inclusion in an FMCT production ban, as mentioned in paragraph 12,it should be emphasized that fissile materials for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices will be banned, while materials for civil purposes will be outside the scope of such a ban.
Turning to verification, there are many different approaches to the verification of the core obligation of an FMCT,which is a"ban on production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.
Moreover, the early start of negotiations in the CD on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices(FMCT) is vital.
An FMCT, as the next logical step to nuclear disarmament andnon-proliferation, is significant in terms of prohibiting the"production" of fissile material for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.
Various discussions conducted until now clearly show there is consensus that a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices would be the core obligation of an FMCT.
Immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally andeffectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.
The Conference therefore calls upon those remaining States not party to the Treaty to accede to it,thereby accepting an international legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and to accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear activities.
Immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory,multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.
Bahrain also calls upon nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty not to transfer any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and not to help or encourage any other State that does not possess nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices to manufactureor acquire such weapons or gain control over them in any other way.
Japan attaches paramount importance to the early commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices FMCT.
Notes with satisfaction that in its report Main Committee III of the Conference recommended that the Conference call on those remaining States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it,thereby accepting an international legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and to accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all their nuclear activities; See NPT/CONF.1995/MC. III/1.
The categories to verify States parties' compliance with their obligation under an FMCT not to produce fissile materials for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices would be.
Calls on the remaining State not party to the Treaty to accede to it,thereby accepting an international legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and to accept IAEA safeguards.
We therefore wish to call once again on those remaining States not Parties to the Treaty to accede to the indefinitely extended NPT,thereby accepting an international legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and to accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear activities.