Примеры использования Proliferation-sensitive nuclear на Английском языке и их переводы на Русский язык
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Controls transactions that could contribute to proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.
The Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan is monitoring the entry into andtransit through its territory of individuals who are associated with the Islamic Republic of Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;
Transfers of proliferation-sensitive nuclear equipment and technology, particularly for enrichment and reprocessing, must continue to receive special attention because such technologies could be used in the production of fissile material for weapons.
Strengthening and implementing these primary instruments,including the adoption of criteria for the transfer of proliferation-sensitive nuclear technology, remains of paramount importance.
These included the broadening of the scope of the proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and nuclear weapons delivery systems-related embargo, the introduction of a travel ban on persons designated in an annex to the resolution as well as on any additional persons designated by the Council or the Committee, and the expansion of the lists of persons and entities subject to the assets freeze and of persons subject to the travel notification requirement.
Prohibiting Iranian banks from initiating new business activities in Member States if related to the Islamic Republic of Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems(resolution 1929(2010), para. 23);
Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1929(2010), paragraph 21, the provision of financial services, including insurance or re-insurance, or the transfer to, through, or from Iran, or to or by its nationals or entities organized under its laws, or persons or financial institutions in its territory, of any financial or other assets or resources is prohibited if there is information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such services, assets orresources could contribute to Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.
Preventing the provision of financial services and transfer of financial assets orresources that could contribute to the Islamic Republic of Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems(resolution 1929(2010), para. 21);
Activities related to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps are also made subject to vigilanceexercised by States and their nationals, persons and firms if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such business could contribute to the Islamic Republic of Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapons delivery systems.
Autonomous designations under the visa ban and the asset freeze, to be decided by the Council of the EU, of persons andentities involved in proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or in violations of Security Council resolutions, of individuals and entities of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines and its subsidiaries.
The Government has also instructed these institutions to exercise special vigilance when doing business with banks domiciled in Iran and their branches and subsidiaries so as toavoid such activities contributing to Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.
Autonomous designations under the visa ban and the asset freeze, to be decided by the Council of the European Union, of persons andentities involved in proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or in violations of Security Council resolutions, of individuals and entities of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines and its subsidiaries.
The Government of the Republic of Korea has instructed its financial institutions to prohibit the provision of financial services, including insurance and reinsurance,in cases where there are reasonable grounds to believe that such services could contribute to Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.
These sanctions are targeted at specific activities, institutions, entities andindividuals related to the Islamic Republic of Iran's prohibited proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and development of a nuclear weapon delivery system, in addition to transfers of conventional weapons.
The Government will take appropriate measures, which will be determined on a case-by-case basis, to prohibit financial institutions within Japanese territory or under its jurisdiction from opening representative offices or subsidiaries orbanking accounts in Iran if the Government has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such financial services could contribute to Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.
The Security Council designates individuals and entities for being directly involved with orproviding support for the Islamic Republic of Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems in resolutions 1737(2006), 1747(2007), 1803(2008) and 1929 2010.
Calls upon States to take appropriate measures that prohibit financial institutions within their territories or under their jurisdiction from opening representative offices or subsidiaries orbanking accounts in Iran if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such financial services could contribute to Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear-weapon delivery systems.
Recognizing that access to diverse, reliable energy is critical for sustainable growth and development, while noting the potential connection between Iran's revenues derived from its energy sector andthe funding of Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, and further noting that chemical process equipment and materials required for the petrochemical industry have much in common with those required for certain sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities.
Welcoming the guidance issued by the Financial Action Task Force(FATF) to assist States in implementing their financial obligations under resolutions 1737(2006) and 1803(2008), and recalling in particular the need to exercise vigilance over transactions involving Iranian banks, including the Central Bank of Iran, so as toprevent such transactions contributing to proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.
Prohibiting financial institutions of Member States from initiating new business in the Islamic Republic of Iran if related to the Islamic Republic of Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems resolution 1929(2010), para. 24.
The competent Chinese authorities have reminded all financial institutions to intensify the screening of their business contacts with Iran and to prevent the provision of financial services, including insurance or re-insurance,if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such services could contribute to Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.
Regulation 17E of the Regulations requires the Minister for Foreign Affairsto specify entities incorporated in Iran or subject to Iranian jurisdiction if the Minister has reasonable grounds to believe that unauthorized business with the entity may contribute to Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, to the development of nuclear-weapon delivery systems, or to a violation of Council resolutions 1737(2006), 1747(2007), 1803(2008) or 1929(2010)"Iran's prohibited activities.
In that paragraph the Council called upon all States to exercise vigilance over the activities of financial institutions in their territories with all banks domiciled in the Islamic Republic of Iran, in particular with Bank Melli and Bank Saderat, and their branches andsubsidiaries abroad, in order to avoid such activities contributing to proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.
The Panel highlights the challenges in identifying specific transactions orbusinesses involving Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps entities that could contribute to the country's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.
The Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Republic of Poland confirms that there are no DPRK citizens involved in specialized teaching ortraining, which could contribute to the DPRK's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and the development of nuclear-weapon delivery systems.
In addition, the Council called upon all States toprevent specialized teaching or training of Iranian nationals in disciplines that would contribute to the Islamic Republic of Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.
The consultations with many Member States showed the difficulty of identifying specific transactions orbusinesses involving the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps that could contribute to Iranian proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapons delivery systems.
In resolution 1737(2006) the Council called upon all States toprevent specialized teaching or training of Iranian nationals in disciplines which would contribute to the Islamic Republic of Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.
In addition, in resolution 1737(2006) the Council called upon all States to prevent specialized teaching ortraining of Iranian nationals in disciplines which would contribute to the proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.
With regard to paragraph 17, there is no cooperation relating to the teaching or training of Iranian specialists or nationals in Yemen by the Government of Yemen orby Yemeni nationals in disciplines that could contribute to the proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.