Примери за използване на Second applicants на Английски и техните преводи на Български
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Ireland case were relevantly different from those at issue in the first and second applicants' cases: in D v.
Against this, the first and second applicants accepted that they obtained medical treatment post-abortion when required.
It is not therefore an effective remedy available both in theory andin practice which the first and second applicants were required to exhaust(see paragraph 142 above).
The Court recalls that,just as for the first and second applicants, there was no legal impediment to the third applicant travelling for an abortion abroad(paragraph 131 above).
Having regard to the broad concept of private life within the meaning of Article 8 including the right to personal autonomy and to physical and psychological integrity(see paragraphs 212-214 above),the Court finds that the prohibition of the termination of the first and second applicants' pregnancies sought for reasons of health and/or well being amounted to an interference with their right to respect for their private lives.
As the Court conceded,“the first and second applicants could have obtained an abortion on request(according to certain criteria including gestational limits) in some 30 such States.
Having regard to paragraphs 147-149 above,the Court also considers that it was clearly foreseeable that the first and second applicants were not entitled to an abortion in Ireland for health and/or well-being reasons.
However, the first and second applicants maintained that the will of the Irish people had changed since the 1983 referendum so that the legitimate aim accepted by the Court in its Open Door judgment was no longer a valid one.
Different submissions were made as regards the first and second applicants, on the one hand, and the third applicant, on the other.
Given the circumstances of the first and second applicants, and the alleged dangers derived from the prohibition on their having an abortion in Ireland, in my view these cases do fall within the Irish State's margin of appreciation, and I therefore agree with the Grand Chamber's conclusion.
In such circumstances, the Court finds that the impugned prohibition in Ireland struck a fair balance between the right of the first and second applicants to respect for their private lives and the rights invoked on behalf of the unborn.
The difference in the substantive complaints of the first and second applicants, on the one hand, and that of the third applicant on the other, requires separate determination of the question whether there has been a breach of Article 8 of the Convention.
On the other hand, it is true that the process of travelling abroad for an abortion was psychologically andphysically arduous for the first and second applicants, additionally so for the first applicant given her impoverished circumstances(paragraph 163 above).
In the case of the first and second applicants, the Court found that the prohibition on the termination of the pregnancies did represent an interference with their right to respect for their private lives, but that interference had been in accordance with the law and had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting public morals as understood in Ireland.
Dismisses unanimously the Government's objection as to a failure to exhaust domestic remedies as regards the first and second applicants and joins this objection to the merits of the third applicant's complaint under Article 8 of the Convention;
The first and second applicants argued that, while a margin was to be accorded, the right to life of the unborn could not be accorded primacy to the exclusion of the proportionate protection of the rights of women and, further, that it was crucial to take account of the consensus outside of Ireland towards broader access to abortion.
Accordingly, the Court dismisses the Government's objection on grounds of a failure to exhaust domestic remedies as regards the first and second applicants and joins this objection to the merits of the third applicant's complaint under Article 8 of the Convention.
In light of the above,the Court does not consider that the limited opinion polls on which the first and second applicants relied(paragraphs 82-88 and 170 above) are sufficiently indicative of a change in the views of the Irish people, concerning the grounds for lawful abortion in Ireland, as to displace the State's opinion to the Court on the exact content of the requirements of morals in Ireland(Handyside v. the United Kingdom judgment and further references cited at 221 above).
Accordingly, and as underlined at paragraph 213 above, in the present cases the Court must examine whether the prohibition of abortion in Ireland for health and/or well-being reasons struck a fair balance between,on the one hand, the first and second applicants' right to respect for their private lives under Article 8 and, on the other, profound moral values of the Irish people as to the nature of life and consequently as to the need to protect the life of the unborn.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that it has not been demonstrated that an action by the first and second applicants seeking a declaration of a constitutional entitlement to an abortion in Ireland on health and/or well-being grounds and, consequently, of the unconstitutionality of sections 58 and 59 of the 1961 Act, would have had any prospect of success.
A broad margin of appreciation was, therefore, in principle to be accorded to the Irish State in determining the question whether a fair balance was struck between the protection of that public interest, notably the protection accorded under Irish law to the right to life of the unborn,and the conflicting rights of the first and second applicants to respect for their private lives under Article 8 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court considers that it has not been demonstrated that the first and second applicants had an effective domestic remedy available to them as regards their complaint about a lack of abortion in Ireland for reasons of health and/or well-being.
I agree for the reasons set out in paragraphs 231-233 that a“broad margin of appreciation is… in principle to be accorded to the Irish State in determining the question whether a fair balance was struck between the protection of that public interest, notably the protection accorded under Irish law to the right to life of the unborn, andthe conflicting rights of the first and second applicants to respect for their private lives under Article 8 of the Convention”.
Irish law prohibits abortion in Ireland for health and well-being reasons butallows women, in the first and second applicants' position who wish to have an abortion for those reason, the option of lawfully travelling to another State to do so.
While there are positive obligations inherent in effective respect for private life(see paragraphs 244-246 below),the Court considers it appropriate to analyse the first and second applicants' complaints as concerning negative obligations, their core argument being that the prohibition in Ireland of abortion where sought for health and/or well-being reasons disproportionately restricted their right to respect for their private lives.
While Article 8 cannot, accordingly, be interpreted as conferring a right to abortion,the Court finds that the prohibition in Ireland of abortion where sought for reasons of health and/or well-being about which the first and second applicants complained, and the third applicant's alleged inability to establish her qualification for a lawful abortion in Ireland, come within the scope of their right to respect for their private lives and accordingly Article 8.
The second applicant became pregnant unintentionally.
In December 2002 the second applicant joined this application.
The second applicant married a Bulgarian citizen and stayed in Bulgaria.
The second applicant already had three children from other relationships.