Examples of using Separated plutonium in English and their translations into Arabic
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Some have presented detailed inventories of their separated plutonium and highly-enriched uranium(HEU) holdings.
Separated plutonium and spent fuel would be kept decentralised in a few locations, an arrangement that would minimise fuel transport.
The same graduated intensity would apply to such separated plutonium product leaving a reprocessing plant for any other facility.
He pointed out that there are more than 1500 tons of HEU and440 tons of separated plutonium in the world.
IAEA interpreted the term to mean HEU or separated plutonium in a report distributed as United Nations document S/1997/779.
Negotiators will, however, need to recognize that these two elements do not pose equal proliferation risks,either between them or in relation to uranium or separated plutonium.
Recognizing that highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium require special precautions, we re-emphasize the importance of appropriately securing, accounting for and consolidating these materials.
A further model for reporting could be INFCIRC/549, which is currently beingused by states to declare stockpiles of civilian separated plutonium(and, in some cases, HEU).
Encourages all other states that separate, hold,process or use separated plutonium in their civil nuclear activities to adopt policies similar to those adopted by the participants in the Guidelines.
In 1992, some inconsistencies had been detected, suggesting that theDemocratic People ' s Republic of Korea might have separated plutonium without declaring it to IAEA.
The Conference notes the existence of substantial civil stocks of separated plutonium and recommends that all such stocks which are not already under international safeguards should be brought under such safeguards systems as soon as practicable.
To put it very simply, an optimal non-proliferation policy(taking into account the risk of terrorism)would involve eradicating HEU and separated plutonium from the face of the earth.
The fact that the world has a stockpile ofthousands of tons of highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium, which are enough to produce more than 100,000 nuclear weapons, is a stark reminder that international peace and security is in a state of absolute crisis.
Parties to the treaty would commit themselves, within a short period of time after the entry into force of the treaty, to making a declaration listing all the facilities within theirjurisdiction capable of producing enriched uranium or separated plutonium.
In this context, the Conference encourages all other States that separate, hold,process or use separated plutonium in their civil nuclear activities to adopt similar policies.
One important element of a broad policy is looking to the nuclear fuel cycle itself, both the military and the civilian, concentrating on those materials which can be used for a nuclear explosive:highly enriched uranium(HEU) and separated plutonium.
There are no indications to suggest that Iraq had producedmore that a few grams of weapon-usable nuclear material(HEU or separated plutonium) through its indigenous processes, all of which has been removed from Iraq.
At the same time, recent crises have demonstrated the need for strengthened export controls on those technologies or materials(enrichment, reprocessing, heavy water production facilities,equipment or related technologies, HEU, separated plutonium).
Under the" focused approach" verification measures would apply to fissile material-i.e. highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium- produced after the treaty ' s entry into force, and to the facilities that produce fissile material, i.e. enrichment and reprocessing plants.
While these differences emerged, it is worth noting that proponents of the" special fissionable material plus neptunium" option suggested that, under that definition, different levels of verification could be considered, depending on the strategic sensitivity of the fissile material, i.e. there could be a lower level of verification for irradiated plutonium in spent fuel and for low-enriched uranium,and a higher level of verification for separated plutonium and for high-enriched uranium.
The Conference encourages all other States that separate, hold,process or use separated plutonium in their civil nuclear activities to adopt policies similar to those which have been adopted by the participants in the Plutonium Management Guidelines(INFCIRC/549).
The Conference recognizes the particular requirement for safeguards of unirradiated direct-use nuclear material andnotes IAEA projections that the use of separated plutonium for peaceful purposes is expected to increase over the next several years.
The Conference encourages all other States that separate, hold,process or use separated plutonium in their civil nuclear activities to adopt policies similar to those which have been adopted by the participants in the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium(see INFCIRC/549).
The Conference recognizes the particular requirement for safeguards on unirradiated direct-use nuclear material, and notes the projections by the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA)that the use of separated plutonium for peaceful purposes is expected to increase over the next several years.
Support efforts to ensure that all sensitive nuclear material(separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium) not intended for use in meeting defence requirements is safely and effectively stored and protected and placed under IAEA safeguards(in the nuclear-weapon States, under the relevant" voluntary offer" IAEA safeguards agreements) as soon as it is practicable to do so;
The IAEA, in a letter dated 19 April 1991, advised Iraq that it was obliged to declare all fissionable material which could be used in the manufacture of a nuclear explosive device,including separated plutonium, uranium enriched to 20% or more in the isotope U235(highly enriched uranium) and U233.
We pledge our support forefforts to ensure that all sensitive nuclear material(separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium) designated as not intended for use for meeting defence requirements is safely stored, protected and placed under IAEA safeguards(in the nuclear-weapon States, under the relevant voluntary offer IAEA safeguards agreements) as soon as it is practicable to do so.
In Australia ' s view, an FMCT would encompass key elements,including a commitment to prohibit the production of highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium for nuclear weapons; appropriate measures to ensure adequate national implementation of the Treaty, as well as periodic review of this work; and appropriate measures to ensure effective verification of States ' implementation of their commitments.
A State that agrees to forego building its own reprocessing capability,but wishes to have its spent fuel reprocessed and to use the separated plutonium and/or uranium in MOX fuel, will want some assurance that the reprocessing services will be available as needed. Or the State will want an assurance that a package of reprocessing and MOX fabrication will be available as necessary.
It could thus be recognized that some States may separate plutonium for recycling in civilian nuclear power reactors.
