Examples of using Retained data in English and their translations into Hungarian
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Official
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Colloquial
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Medicine
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Ecclesiastic
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Financial
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Programming
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Official/political
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Computer
The directive states that retained data can only be accessible to the competent national authorities.
The Court applies that case-law to the rules governing the retention of data and those governing access to the retained data.
In particular the proposal strictly limits the purposes for which the retained data may be provided to law enforcement authorities.
That obligation must be observed not only by service providers that retain data, but also by the authorities that have accessed the retained data.
Research data is a set of produced, recorded, accepted and retained data from the scientific community that support the credibility of the research results.
The retained data, taken as a whole, is liable to allow very precise conclusions to be drawn concerning the private lives of the persons whose data has been retained. .
From a practical point of view, none of the three parties concerned by a request for access is in a position tocarry out an effective review in connection with access to the retained data.
The Member States were to ensure that retained data would be provided to competent national authorities only in well-defined cases and in accordance with national law.
Lastly, I would add that, from a practical point of view, none of the three parties concerned by a request for access is in a position tocarry out an effective review in connection with access to the retained data.
Law enforcement authorities in mostMember States have reported to the Commission that retained data plays a central role in protecting the public against harm through effective criminal investigation.
As the French Government has rightly pointed out, such obligations, by contrast with targeted surveillance measures, enable law enforcement authorities to‘examine the past', so to speak, by consulting retained data.
The Court states that, with respect to retention, the retained data, taken as a whole, is liable to allow very precise conclusions to be drawn concerning the private lives of the persons whose data has been retained. .
According to Tele2 Sverige and the Commission, that requirement is not satisfied by the Swedish regime at issue in Case C‑203/15,which allows the retained data to be accessed for the purpose of combating ordinary offences.
The Court states that, with respect to retention, the retained data, taken as a whole, is liable to allow very precise conclusions to be drawn concerning the private lives of the persons whose data has been retained. .
It follows from those characteristics, and in particular from the requirement for adequate protection against arbitrary interference, that the measures must bebinding on the national authorities upon which the power to access the retained data is conferred.
In particular, the Commission should ensure more harmonisation in specific areas, such as: the measures ensuring the respect for fundamental rights and freedoms, including the data retention periods, the purpose limitations,as well as the necessary safeguards to access retained data and protect personal data. .
Retained data was for example crucial to the success of Operation Rescue which helped reveal the identities of 670 suspected members of an international paedophile network and protect children from abuse in Member States where the directive has been transposed.
Because retention of data has proved to be such a necessary and effective investigative tool for law enforcement in several Member States, and in particular concerning serious matters such as organised crime and terrorism,it is necessary to ensure retained data are made available to law enforcement authorities for a certain period, subject to the conditions provided for in the Directive.
The competent national authorities to whom access to the retained data had been granted, had to notify the persons affected, under the applicable national procedures, as soon as that notification was no longer liable to jeopardize the investigations being undertaken by those authorities.
Further, since the objective pursued by that legislation must be proportionate to the seriousness of the interference in fundamental rights that that access entails, it follows that, in the area of prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution ofcriminal offences, only the objective of fighting serious crime is capable of justifying such access to the retained data.
Likewise, the competent national authorities to whom access to the retained data has been granted must notify the persons affected, under the applicable national procedures, as soon as that notification is no longer liable to jeopardise the investigations being undertaken by those authorities.
To illustrate this view, the German Government has suggested the metaphor of‘communicating vessels': a more flexible approach toone of the three aspects identified by the Court(such as access to the retained data) may be compensated by a stricter approach to the other two aspects(the retention period and the security and protection of the data). .
That‘outsourcing' of data retention admittedly allows the retained data to be distanced from the public authorities of the Member States and thus to be placed beyond their direct grip and any control,(70) but by that very fact it simultaneously increases the risk of use which is incompatible with the requirements resulting from the right to privacy.
The difficulty which Directive 2006/24 raises, I would again like to repeat, is that it is a directive which seeks only to impose an obligation on the providers of electronic communications services to collect and retain traffic and location data for electronic communications,not to lay down the safeguards which must govern access to the retained data and their use.
As regards compatibility with the principle of proportionality, national legislation governing the conditions under which the providers of electronic communications services mustgrant the competent national authorities access to the retained data must ensure, in accordance with what was stated in paragraphs 95 and 96 of this judgment, that such access does not exceed the limits of what is strictly necessary.
Accordingly, and since general access to all retained data, regardless of whether there is any link, at least indirect, with the intended purpose, cannot be regarded as limited to what is strictly necessary, the national legislation concerned must be based on objective criteria in order to define the circumstances and conditions under which the competent national authorities are to be granted access to the data of subscribers or registered users.
As regards objectives that are capable of justifying national legislation that derogates from the principle of confidentiality of electronic communications, it must be borne in mind that, since, as stated in paragraphs 90 and 102 of this judgment, the list of objectives set out in thefirst sentence of Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58 is exhaustive, access to the retained data must correspond, genuinely and strictly, to one of those objectives.
Similarly, a national regime that provided for a retention period of three months and the retention of the data in encrypted form within the national territory(representing a strict approach to retention period and security),but which allowed all employees of all public authorities access to the retained data(representing a flexible approach to access) would expose the entire population to a significant risk of abuse on the part of the national authorities.