Examples of using Direct-use in English and their translations into Russian
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Under the definition, direct-use material includes both irradiated and unirradiated material.
It is noted that Pu in spent reactor fuel is categorized as a direct-use material.
TEV is an aggregate of direct-use value plus indirect-use value plus option value plus existence value.
It corresponds to the standard International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA)definition of direct-use material.
In general, for direct-use material, this is 8 kilograms of plutonium and 25 kilograms of highly enriched uranium.
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Any nuclear material containing more than 20 per cent of plutonium-239 constitutes direct-use material for nuclear weapons.
In this respect, the term"direct-use material" can be a reference for further consideration to define"fissile material" for FMCT negotiations.
The definition of fissile material to be included in an FMCT could be close to this definition of separated direct-use nuclear material.
In the IAEA Safeguards Glossary"direct-use material" is defined as nuclear material that can be used for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices without transmutation or further enrichment.
A good basis for discussion of what constitutes such material is the definition of"direct-use materials" used by the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA.
In this regard, Slovakia favours further discussion on these issues, to be based on existing relevant IAEA definitions,such as a definition of"direct-use material.
The definition of plutonium conforms to the IAEA definition of"direct-use material," i.e."nuclear material that can be used for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices without transmutation or further enrichment.
The cost base is reduced by eliminating non-value adding steps,offering»easy-to-handle« and»direct-use« solutions to customers, such as converters.
The materials regarded by the IAEA for safeguards purposes as"direct-use materials"- nuclear material that could be used for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices without transmutation or further enrichment- are as follows.
Level 1: a simple state declaration(source materials); level 2: instrumented verification(e.g. for special fissionable material);level 3: random verification(irradiated direct-use material); level 4: full verification unirradiated direct-use material.
The materials regarded by the IAEA for safeguards purposes as"direct-use materials"- nuclear material that could be used for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices without transmutation or further enrichment- are as follows.
In this context, it was proposed that IAEA,in cooperation with the States parties, should define as well as ensure the implementation of, the minimum standard for the direct-use and dual-use export controls in the nuclear field that are necessary to achieve the non-proliferation goals of the Treaty.
Special fissionable material plus neptunium" and"unirradiated direct-use material", and"special fissionable material plus neptunium" and"unirradiated direct-use material" are not the only options for the definitions of the terms"fissile material" and"production" in an FMCT.
FMCT verification should thus do likewise: for example, the verification related to theproduction of un-irradiated direct-use material should be at a full verification level, but that it could be less for the verification of irradiated direct-use material.
In the production of direct-use material for non-proscribed purposes, for example, naval propulsion or as fuel for high-flux research reactors or for use in critical assemblies, there would need to be some mechanism for this material to be declared so that it could be distinguished from preexisting stocks of fissile material and to ensure that it does not serve as a means of circumventing the intent of the FMCT.
We note the political sensitivity of the issue of stocks, butit must be recognized that the existence of direct-use material in unknown quantities and locations that are not subject to verification introduces an element of uncertainty in any future treaty.
For the purposes of IAEA safeguards, direct-use nuclear materials are: plutonium except that containing 80% or more of the isotope plutonium-238, uranium containing 20% or more of the isotope uranium-235, and uranium-233."Separated direct-use nuclear materials" are those direct-use nuclear materials that have been separated from fission products and thus the processing that would be required for their use in nuclear weapons is substantially less and the times required substantially shorter than if mixed with highly radioactive fission products.
It refers to the types of material that require the highest level of safeguards verification coverage."Direct-use material" includes all of the material that in principle can be used to produce a nuclear weapon or a nuclear explosive device.
The materials regarded by theInternational Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA) as"direct-use materials" for safeguards purposes, namely nuclear materials which could be used in the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices without transmutation or further enrichment, are: highly enriched uranium- uranium enriched to 20 per cent or more in the isotope uranium-235; plutonium containing less than 80 per cent of the isotope plutonium-238; and uranium-233.
By banning and verifying the production of fissile materials, an FMCT would contribute to the implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, andby limiting the amount of direct-use materials that may be accessible to non-State actors for building improvised nuclear explosive devices it could also significantly limit the opportunities for nuclear terrorist acts.
Some delegations have suggested a broader definition,including all fissionable material or all irradiated direct-use material; however, we believe that this would impose unnecessary burdens on both the inspectors and inspected States parties to any FMCT, without a commensurate increase in security.
States could, for example, constrain the technical objective of verification to the provision of assurance that all production facilities of direct-use material are either shut down or operated subject to verification, and that all stocks of fissile material not specifically excluded from verification once an FMCT enters into force would remain subject to verification.
Allow me at this point to present in very basic terms what Germany considers that an FMCT should, as minimum requirements,encompass: a ban on the production of direct-use fissile material for nuclear weapons following IAEA definitions; a ban on the transfer to nuclear-weapon-related purposes of fissile material produced for civil use before or after the entry into force of an FMCT; a ban on the reuse of fissile material derived from disarmament measures.