Examples of using Nuclear weapons capability in English and their translations into Russian
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Official
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Colloquial
Accordingly, any increase in nuclear weapons capability should equal a reduction in political credibility.
Subsequently, we decided that we no longer needed to retain a maritime tactical nuclear weapons capability.
A strong andverifiable final barrier on the road to acquiring a nuclear weapons capability was a vital component of a comprehensive approach to addressing common security challenges.
Meaningful steps toward permanent disarmament would add to their moral authority in demanding that others must not develop nuclear weapons capability.
Iran's continued pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability undercuts the Treaty and risks sparking a regional reaction that could further strain the NPT and could doom hopes for universal adherence to the Treaty.
It should not be tolerated that a State withdraws from the Treaty after having developed a nuclear weapons capability under false pretences.
The decision of the United Kingdom to renew and further develop its nuclear weapons capability by approving the Trident programme is in full contravention of article VI of the Treaty and in defiance of the unanimous decision of the 2000 Review Conference.
While Israel maintains a policy of nuclear ambiguity,it is widely assumed to have developed a significant nuclear weapons capability.
The Iranian regime still refuses to cooperate fully with IAEA andrefuses to suspend its pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability despite being required to suspend its efforts to produce fissile materials by the United Nations Security Council.
But most importantly, the agreement comes to an end, andso we can almost start the countdown clock as to when they will resume their nuclear weapons capability.
The self-serving Israeli propaganda and arrogant behaviour coupled with its well-known nuclear weapons capability constitute a threat to regional security and represent yet another manifestation of the persistence of the expansionist and inherently aggressive policies of the Zionist entity.
While Israel maintains a policy of nuclear ambiguity,it is widely assumed to have developed a significant nuclear weapons capability.
The decision of the United Kingdom to renew and further develop its nuclear weapons capability, by approving the Trident Project, is in full contravention of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and defies the unanimous decision of the 2000 Review Conference.
The United Kingdom Government has concluded that we can meet the minimum requirement of an effective andcredible level of deterrence with a smaller nuclear weapons capability.
The recent decision of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to renew and further develop its nuclear weapons capability, by approving the Trident Project, is in full contravention of article VI of the NPT and in defiance with the unanimous decision of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.
Only the full cessation anddismantling of fissile material production by the Iranian authorities could begin to provide any assurance that they were no longer pursuing a nuclear weapons capability.
The Agency will exercise this right when(a) it assesses the information to be credible and when(b)the indicated nuclear weapons capability can be readily concealed or destroyed.
The threat of global nuclear war had clearly receded, but regional conflicts of the kind seen in recent years risked provoking wider tensions,and the possibility that they would engage the interests of States possessing nuclear weapons capability could not be ruled out.
Iran's extensive past undeclared nuclear activities, together with its efforts to acquire the full nuclear fuel cycle without any justifiable reason,suggested that it was seeking to develop a nuclear weapons capability that was contrary to its Treaty commitments.
Increased transparency by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear weapons capabilities.
If another State were to develop nuclear weapon capabilities, it would necessarily involve an NPT State party acting in breach of its treaty commitments.
On the contrary, additional States have demonstrated a nuclear weapon capability, at the expense of the international non-proliferation regime in this area, whose universality and strengthening is essential for international security.
In turn, if more States develop nuclear weapon capabilities, this could, in time, provoke others to do likewise, and undermine the security of all.
Furthermore, steps to increase transparency regarding nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI serve as a confidence-building measure and should be strongly supported.
Increased transparency with regard to nuclear weapons capabilities as a voluntary confidence-building measure was strongly advocated.
It was imperative to involve in the discussion of such issues States that had not signed the Treaty but had nuclear weapons capabilities.
The Conference recommends the States parties to consider further ways to improve the measures to prevent diversion of nuclear technology for nuclear weapons, other nuclear explosive purposes or nuclear weapon capabilities.
The Conference realizes that export controls should be applied inorder to protect against those NPT parties that would seek nuclear weapons capabilities under the cover of a peaceful nuclear programme and that such measures are fully consistent with Article IV.
Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of disarmament agreements and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament.
The importance of increased transparency with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI, and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament, was confirmed.