Примеры использования Absence of undeclared nuclear material на Английском языке и их переводы на Русский язык
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Without the additional protocol, the IAEA cannot provide credible assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activity.
We expect that in 2003 the Agency will draw its conclusion of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activity and thus open the way to the implementation of integrated safeguards in Hungary.
And without the additional protocol, the Agency cannot provide credible assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activity.
IAEA could provide assurance of the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities only for those States that had both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force.
Otherwise, the Agency will not be able to provide full assurances about State activities norcredible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities.
As noted above, the NWS andnon-NPT parties would also have to accept verification aimed at providing assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities- i.e. nuclear material and activities that are required to be declared under the FMCT.
The Additional Protocol, when fully implemented in addition to States' comprehensive safeguards agreements,can provide the IAEA with the enhanced verification ability to assure the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.
With respect to the latter,Canada anticipates that the IAEA will soon be in a position to provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Canada, a necessary condition for the transition to integrated safeguards.
As I have said repeatedly, without safeguards agreements, the Agency cannot provide any assurance about a State's nuclear activities, andwithout additional protocols we cannot provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.
Confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme requires that the IAEA be able to provide assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, through the implementation of the Additional Protocol and required transparency measures.
Furthermore, comprehensive safeguards agreements, which were essential in verifying thenon-diversion of declared nuclear material, needed to be supplemented by additional protocols to allow IAEA to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.
The IAEA Model Additional Protocol serves as the basis for the regulations,including implementing complementary access to, inter alia, locations to assure the absence of undeclared nuclear material and to verify the decommissioning of locations formerly storing nuclear materials. .
With Canada's comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol in place,IAEA has reached annual conclusions regarding the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Canada.
In the latter case, the Additional Protocol helps to provide credible assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.
While recognizing the value of a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement in providing measures for verifying the non-diversion of declared nuclear material, the Vienna Group is conscious that such measures are not sufficient for the Agency to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.
The additional protocol is an indispensable measure for providing credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.
While recognizing the value of a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement in providing measuresfor verifying the non-diversion of declared nuclear material, the Vienna Group is conscious that such measures are not sufficient for the Agency to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.
Following the entry into force of the protocol andits full implementation, IAEA could provide credible assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iraq.
Comprehensive safeguards agreements are essential for verifying the nondiversion of declared nuclear material, butare not sufficient for the Agency to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.
The Conference is of the view that the implementation of additional protocols equips IAEA with efficient andeffective tools for obtaining additional information about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in non-nuclear-weapon States.
While a comprehensive safeguards agreement is essential in providing measures for verifying the non-diversionof declared nuclear material, such measures alone are not sufficient for the Agency to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.
The wider access to information andlocations provided by States under Additional Protocols significantly increased the Agency's ability to provide assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in those States.
The Additional Protocol can play a pivotal role in strengthening international non-proliferation regime and increase the transparency of States' nuclear related activities, by providing the IAEA with the enhanced ability to, inter alia,verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.
Many States parties noted that comprehensive safeguards agreements were not sufficient for the IAEA to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.
Additional protocols to safeguards agreements between States andIAEA were indispensable instruments enabling the Agency to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.
With both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in place,IAEA is in a position to draw an annual conclusion regarding the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for Canada as a whole.
It evolved from a system focused on declared nuclear material at declared nuclear facilities toa much more comprehensive, information-driven system able to provide credible assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in States as a whole.
These efforts included the development of comprehensive safeguards agreements, the Model Additional Protocol andintegrated safeguards that aim at providing credible assurances regarding the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.
Comprehensive safeguards agreements are essential for verifying the non-diversion of declared nuclear material, but are not sufficient for the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA)to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.
IAEA, as the competent authority designated under article III to apply safeguards, verifies the correctness and completeness of a State's declarations,with a view to providing assurances of the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.