Примеры использования Al-qaida's на Английском языке и их переводы на Русский язык
{-}
-
Official
-
Colloquial
Al-Qaida's poisonous ideology has thrived on repression.
As a result of national and international action, Al-Qaida's funding has decreased significantly.
Al-Qaida's core has seen no revival of its fortunes over the past six months.
It was emphasized that the operational impact of Al-Qaida's core leadership has steadily declined since the death of Usama bin Laden in 2011.
Al-Qaida's structure provided coordination and support for groups of fighters with certain objectives in common, and supplied troops for the Taliban.
The event had followed a regional meeting of security chiefs concerning the need for African leaders to work together to curtail Al-Qaida's influence.
As a result of our efforts, Al-Qaida's command and control structure has been largely dismantled.
Replies by Al-Zawahiri* and other prominent Al-Qaida leaders, such as Muhammad al-Hakaymah andAbu Yahya al-Libi, show the extent of Al-Qaida's concern at this ideological challenge.
In the Middle East, Al-Qaida's influence has diminished in Yemen but risen in the Syrian Arab Republic.
As a result, the current version of the List does not record the transformation of Al-Qaida's structure over the past years or the extent of its regional networks.
We have to prevent Al-Qaida's terrorism from being reinforced in the Sahel region through the release of uncontrolled weapons.
Though some States may bemore diligent than others, the Team does not believe that Al-Qaida's continuing capacity is the result of any deliberate disregard of the sanctions.
The relative weakness of Al-Qaida's core has enabled a number of affiliates to operate more freely, with some operating almost completely independently.
The link between cross-border crime and terrorism began to be highlighted following Al-Qaida's bombings of American embassies in the United Republic of Tanzania and Kenya in 1998.
An attack on Al-Qaida's communications, in addition to its finances, travel and arms, would certainly add a major new element to the sanctions regime.
As early as 1998, in the aftermath of attacks on the United States embassies in Nairobi andDar es Salaam, Al-Qaida's East Africa network began to reorganize in anticipation of future operations.
Al-Qaida's senior leadership remains penned in on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and faces a slow attrition from air strikes and betrayal.
The Taliban have become more confident and aggressive, and while Al-Qaida's impact may have declined in Iraq, its influence elsewhere seems to have held steady or increased.
Al-Qaida's narrative continues to inspire and guide a loose, geographically diverse and largely independent network of jihadist movements around the world.
The United Nations is seeking to build upon initial experiences in Somalia to counter the terrorist threat posed by Al-Qaida's infiltration of Touareg non-State armed groups in the north of Mali.
While new studies claim to document Al-Qaida's financial networks and facilitators, they nearly all relate to the period around 2001.
While counter-terrorism experts and intelligence andsecurity officials in touch with the Team agree that something must be done to combat Al-Qaida's use of the Internet, there is as yet no agreement on what that should be.
Al-Qaida's main links with the Taliban became local and tactical, often reflecting individual and personal connections rather than institutional ones.
Taliban and Al-Qaida culpability was also supported by Mr. Michael Hayden, the Director of the United States Central Intelligence Agency.He alleged in a Washington Post interview on 18 January 2008 that Ms. Bhutto was killed by fighters allied with Baitullah Mehsud with support from Al-Qaida's terrorist network.
In particular, Al-Qaida's leadership was at its weakest since 11 September 2001 and had been irrelevant to the recent political change in North Africa and the Middle East.
In 2010, the Office of the Public Prosecutor of the Confederation closed the investigation into an Algerian national who, between 2004 and 2005, supported the criminal activities of the Salafist Group for Call and Combat,an armed group which has been officially integrated into Al-Qaida's international jihadist movement since 2006.
Al-Qaida's ambitions, including to acquire weapons of mass casualty, are more constrained by its own limitations, and by international safeguards, than by explicit enforcement of the sanctions regime.
In its second report to the Al-Qaida and Taliban sanctions Committee pursuant to paragraph 13 of resolution 1455(2003) of 17 January 2003, submitted to the Committee on 3 November 2003,15 the Al-Qaida andTaliban Monitoring Group drew attention to the global scale of Al-Qaida's operations and suggested that the obligation of Member States to enforce the arms embargo should be coupled with enhanced regional and international cooperation aimed at preventing weapons and military materiel from being acquired by the Al-Qaida network.
Although Al-Qaida's core has a significantly reduced capability for international attack planning, its rhetoric and its calls for attacks continue to mobilize violent radicals, regardless of where they are based.
The only crimes of the victims had been to oppose Al-Qaida's extremist ideology and perverse, un-Islamic conception of religion and to defend a unified, secular Syria free of discrimination in which all lived in security.