Примеры использования Grounds for determining на Английском языке и их переводы на Русский язык
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Colloquial
The legal grounds for determining what misconduct is are elaborated in several instruments.
As had been pointed out, a conflict might arise, not because of a mistake,but because of differing grounds for determining the requisites for a main proceeding, for example.
A consistent pattern of gross, flagrant ormass violations of human rights in Bangladesh would not as such constitute sufficient grounds for determining that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture after his return to that country; specific grounds must exist indicating that he would be personally at risk.
It follows that, irrespective of whether a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights can be said toexist in Sri Lanka, such existence would not as such constitute sufficient grounds for determining that the complainants would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon return to Sri Lanka.
It follows that the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant ormass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient grounds for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk.
The Committee recalls its established jurisprudence whereby the existence in a country of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant ormass violations of human rights does not as such constitute sufficient grounds for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture on return to that country.
Consequently the existence in the country of a pattern of gross, flagrant ormass violations of human rights does not as such constitute sufficient grounds for determining that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture on extradition to that country; additional grounds must exist to indicate that the individual concerned would be personally at risk.
It follows that, irrespective of whether a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights can be said to exist in Sri Lanka,such existence would not as such constitute sufficient grounds for determining that the complainant would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon his return to Sri Lanka.
It follows that the existence in that country of a pattern of gross, flagrant ormass violations of human rights does not in itself constitute sufficient grounds for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture if deported to that country. Additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individuals concerned would be personally at risk.
In accordance with the Committee's jurisprudence, the existence of a consistent pattern of gross,flagrant or mass violation of human rights in a country does not of itself constitute sufficient grounds for determining whether the person in question would be at risk of being subject to torture upon return to that country.
The existence of a consistent pattern of gross,flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient grounds for determining whether a person would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon his or her return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be in danger.
In accordance with the Committee's jurisprudence, the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant ormass violation of human rights in a country does not of itself constitute sufficient grounds for determining whether the person in question would be at risk of being subjected to torture upon return to that country.
The State party submits that the existence of a consistent pattern of gross,flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient grounds for determining that a particular person would be at risk of being subjected to torture upon his or her return to that country, and recalls the Committee's jurisprudence in that regard.
It refers to the Committee's jurisprudence that the existence of a pattern of gross, flagrant ormass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient grounds for determining that a particular person would be at risk of being subjected to torture upon his return to that country.
It follows that the existence in that country of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant ormass violations of human rights does not in itself constitute sufficient grounds for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture if expelled to that country. Additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk.
With regard to the State party's arguments regarding the merits of the case, the complainant says that she has substantial grounds for fearing for her safety andthat the State party's argument that the general conditions in a country do not constitute sufficient grounds for determining whether a person returning to the country would be in danger of being subjected to torture is unconvincing.
It follows that the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant ormass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient grounds for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture if expelled to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk.
On the merits, the State party refers to the Committee's jurisprudence that the existence of a pattern of gross, flagrant ormass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient grounds for determining that a particular person would be at risk of being subjected to torture upon his return to that country.
Accordingly, the existence in a country of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant ormass violations of human rights does not as such constitute sufficient grounds for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture on return to that country. Additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk.
In paragraph 320 of Part IIof the previous report, it was mentioned that a study was being carried out by LRC on the grounds for determining domicile, in which the domicile of married women was being reviewed.
It follows that the existence of a consistent pattern of gross,flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient grounds for determining whether the particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon his return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk.
It follows that the existence in that country of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant ormass violations of human rights does not in itself constitute sufficient grounds for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture if expelled to that country.
It follows that the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant ormass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient grounds for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture if expelled to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk.
On the merits, the State party submits that the existence of a pattern of gross,flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient grounds for determining that a particular person would be at risk of being subjected to torture upon his return to that country.
It follows that the existence of a consistent pattern of gross,flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient grounds for determining whether the particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon his return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk.
The State party refers to the Committee's jurisprudence that the existence of a pattern of gross,flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient grounds for determining that a particular person would be at risk of being subjected to torture upon his return to that country.
It follows that the existence in that country of a pattern of gross, flagrant ormass violations of human rights does not in itself constitute sufficient grounds for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture if deported to that country. Additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individuals concerned would be personally at risk.
It refers to the Committee's jurisprudence that the existence of a pattern of gross, flagrant ormass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient grounds for determining that a particular person would be at risk of being subjected to torture upon his return to that country.
It follows that the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant ormass violations of human rights in a country does not as such constitute sufficient grounds for determining whether the particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon his return to that country; additional grounds must be adduced to show that the individual concerned would be personally at risk.
In accordance with the Committee's jurisprudence, the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant ormass violation of human rights in a country does not of itself constitute sufficient grounds for determining whether the person in question would be at risk of being subjected to torture upon return to that country.