Examples of using Second plea in English and their translations into German
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Official
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Colloquial
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Ecclesiastic
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Medicine
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Financial
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Ecclesiastic
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Political
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Computer
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Programming
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Official/political
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Political
The second plea.
I therefore propose that the Court dismiss the second plea.
The second plea in law.
The Commission rejects thevarious arguments put forward by the applicant in its second plea.
The second plea.
The second plea is based on an infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94.
Therefore, the Commission's second plea must be rejected as unfounded.
My second plea concerns Afghanistan.
Having regard to all of these considerations, I consider that the second plea should therefore be rejected as unfounded.
The second plea falls into four parts.
It follows that, irrespective even of its inadmissibility, the second plea, which is based on a false premise, clearly lacks any foundation in law.
The second plea falls into three parts.
In my view, this second plea comprises two limbs.
A second plea from Keller reaches some influential contemporaries in larger Swiss cities.
The Court will examine the applicants' arguments relating to this second plea only in so far as they raise issues that were not examined in connection with the first plea. .
The second plea in law must therefore be dismissed.
In particular, it is not necessary to examine the second plea, in which the applicants allege that the statement of reasons for the contested decision regarding logistical and commercial assistance is inadequate.
The second plea, relating to errors committed by OHIM as regards the assessment of the evidence of the existence of some of the earlier rights.
In the present case, the applicants contest,in particular by their first and second pleas, the substantive legality of the contested decision, while only their sixth plea goes to the failure to open the formal investigation procedure and thus failure to respect the procedural guarantees provided for in Article 88(2) EC from which the.
By a second plea, FIAMM and Fedon submit that, in holding when it examined their claims expressed in terms of no-fault Community liability that the damage suffered by them was not unusual in nature, the Court of First Instance adopted illogical reasoning and infringed certain principles that are well established in the case-law.
The second plea: breach of the principle of observance of vested rights.
By its second plea, the Commission submits that there has been an infringement of its right to be heard.
B- The second plea, based on breach of the obligation to state reasons laid down by Article 190 of the Treaty.
The second plea: improper reference to the oligopolistic structure of the markets in winter sports articles.
In that second plea, the applicant also argued that the Board of Appeal was not competent to assess the validity of the same mark.
The second plea: infringement of the general conditions governing the authorisation of aid laid down by Article 92(3)(c) of the Treaty.
By a second plea, Deichmann additionally claimed that the Board of Appeal had wrongly held that it had not adduced proof of its earlier international trade mark.
By its second plea, Hoechst claims that there has been a breach of its right to be heard in respect of the objection relating to its role as a leader of the cartel, which, according to the Decision, constituted an aggravating circumstance.
By its second plea, which should be examined first since it challenges the formal validity of the judgment under appeal, the Commission submits that the Court of First Instance infringed the rights of the defence in finding that the successive adoption of the first three Steel Aid Codes had created a legal situation that was am-biguous, without giving the Commission the opportunity to present its arguments on this point.
By their second plea, FIAMM and Fedon submit that, in concluding that the damage incurred by them was not unusual in nature and accordingly rejecting their claim for compensation founded on a liability regime applicable in the absence of unlawful conduct of the Community institutions, the Court of First Instance gave reasons that were insufficiently explained, illogical and at variance with the relevant settled case-law.
