Examples of using Margin squeeze in English and their translations into Slovak
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Refusal to supply and margin squeeze.
As regards the margin squeeze, recitals 102 to 105 to the contested decision state.
In particular,economic replicability will require a properly-specified ex ante"margin squeeze" test.
The resulting settlement was based on the margin squeeze methodology as established in the Deutsche Telekom decision50.
In particular, the Commission concluded that Slovak Telekom refused to supply unbundled access to its local loops to competitors,and imposed a margin squeeze on alternative operators.
Since the beginning of 2002,[the applicant] could in any event have reduced the margin squeeze, by increasing the ADSL retail access charges not subject to the price cap system.'.
The conduct concerned a margin squeeze by Telefónica between the wholesale prices it charged to competitors and the retail prices it charged to its own customers from 2001 to 2006.
The Commission accepted Deutsche Telekom's commitments to bring the margin squeeze to an end on a lasting basis from 1 April 2004.53.
In margin squeeze cases the benchmark which the Commission will generally rely on to determine the costs of an as efficient competitor are the LRAIC of the downstream division of the integrated dominant firm55.
It explains that,‘since 1 January 2002,[the applicant's]only legal means of reducing the margin squeeze has been limited to increases in the T-DSL charges'(recital 206).
In addition, the applicant could not be unaware that that margin squeeze entailed serious restrictions on competition, particularly in view of its monopoly on the wholesale market and its virtual monopoly on the market in retail access services(recitals 97 to 100 to the contested decision).
This additional fine was imposed to sanction Deutsche Telekom's repeated abusive behaviour-Deutsche Telekom was fined in 2003 for a margin squeeze in the German market for access to its unbundled local loop in Germany.
In the second place,the applicant claims that the method used by the Commission to identify a margin squeeze is defective, because it relies on the proposition that it should be possible for the applicant's competitors to replicate its customer pattern entirely(recitals 120 to 127 to the contested decision).
Accordingly, the Commission finds in the contested decision(recital 206) that‘since 1 January 2002,[the applicant's]only legal means of reducing the margin squeeze has been limited to increases in the T-DSL charges'.
The Napier Brown/British Sugar decision',the Commission also took the view that a margin squeeze should be calculated on the basis of the charges and costs of the vertically integrated dominant operator(recital 66).
However, as the positive spread was insufficient to cover the applicant's productspecific costs linked to the provision of retail services,there was a margin squeeze in 2002(recitals 154 and 160 to the contested decision).
In order to be able to find a margin squeeze and in view of the narrow definition of the market used in the contested decision, the Commission should have taken account of additional revenue from the applicant's competitors for connection and higher-value services see, to that effect, Case T-342/99 Airtours v Commission.
(iii) Absence of an abuse because theapplicant had insufficient scope to avoid a margin squeeze by increasing its retail prices in the period from 1 January 1998 to 31 December 2001.
However, as regards the period after January 2002, any scope the applicant may have had to fix charges for broadband connections(assuming that was established),would in any event have no bearing on the margin squeeze alleged(see paragraphs 80 to 83 below).
Second, the applicant criticises themethod used by the Commission to demonstrate the existence of a margin squeeze based on the proposition that the applicant's competitors would have an interest in entirely replicating its customer pattern.
Instead of refusing to supply, a dominant undertaking may charge a price for the product on the upstream market which, compared to the price it charges on the downstream market54, does not allow even anas efficient competitor to trade profitably in the downstream market on a lasting basis(a so-called"margin squeeze").
According to the contested decision(recitals 164 and 199),the applicant had sufficient scope to end the margin squeeze in the period from 1 January 1998 to 31 December 2001 by increasing its retail charges for access to analogue and ISDN lines.
As regards the methodology of the margin squeeze test, the Commission finds that, through access to the applicant's local network, its competitors can offer their endusers a range of retail access services, namely analogue narrowband access, digital narrowband access(ISDN) and broadband access in the form of ADSL services.
It follows that the applicant did not use the discretion available to it in order to secure an increase in its retail prices,which would have helped to reduce the margin squeeze in the period from 1 January 1998 to 31 December 2001.
One reason for the further decrease of the wholesale line sharing feesis that BNetzA based its ex ante margin squeeze test on the costs of DT(which were the basis for the Deutsche Telekom decision) and on the(most probably higher) costs of an ecient operator.
A margin squeeze occurs if the difference between the retail prices charged by a dominant company and the wholesale prices it charges its competitors for comparable products is negative, or insufficient to cover the costs to the dominant company of providing its own retail products on the downstream market.
At this stage, the Commission takes the view that Slovak Telekom may have refused to supply unbundled access to its local loops and wholesale services to competitors,and may have imposed a margin squeeze on alternative operators by charging unfair wholesale prices, in breach of EU antitrust rules.
In addition,NRAs may also apply an ex ante margin squeeze test to regulated wholesale inputs in order to ensure that wholesale access pricing of copper-based access products does not hinder competition at retail level or to ensure an adequate economic space between the different copper access inputs.
In those circumstances, it is necessary to consider whether the Commission was correct to find in the contested decision that the applicant had sufficient scope during the two periods identified in paragraphs 94 and 95 above to increase its retail prices,so as to end or reduce the margin squeeze identified in the contested decision.