Examples of using Multipolarity in English and their translations into Vietnamese
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Multipolarity is gaining traction and will have two broad axes.
NOTING the on-going changes in the world and the increasing tendency towards multipolarity;
What is crucial for Beijing is multipolarity, and it will pursue that principle assiduously.
This transformation suggests that the U.S. isexperiencing enormous difficulties trying to adapt to multipolarity.
My sense is that until 2018, multipolarity was a more theoretical concept- more something to write about than to witness.
This is not true of 2016,which is moving toward greater multipolarity in international affairs.
Essentially, multipolarity means that instead of speaking a common language, the major poles speak different policy languages.
When Russian and Chinese leaders get together,one of the buzzwords they use to discuss their policies is“multipolarity.”.
Multipolarity, where regions do things distinctly and differently, is also very different from multilateralism, where they do them together.
However, I believe that this deductive case provides a sound basis for accepting theargument that bipolarity is more peaceful than multipolarity;
Multipolarity, as derived from past European experience, implies an international system in which a number of great powers enjoy primacy in both challenging and managing international order.
At a more grassroots level,the implications of the end of globalization as we know it and the path to multipolarity will become a greater part of the political debate.
Worldwide multipolarity is already a feature of diplomacy and economics, but the South China Sea could show us what multipolarity in a military sense actually looks like.
Geopolitical analyst and Svobodnaya Pressa columnist Sergei Aksenov was more blunt, suggesting that Duterte's proposal is fully inline with Moscow's strategy of promoting global multipolarity.
Multipolarity, as derived from past European experience, implies an international system in which a number of great powers enjoy primacy in both challenging and managing international order.
Plus, Russia's views on regional security, including its support for multipolarity and non-intervention and consensus-based decision-making, align well with those of the states in Southeast Asia.
Modi's meetings with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Wuhan, with Putin in Sochi, India's participation in the 2+2 dialogue with the US, andits S-400 defence systems deal with Russia are emblematic of this multipolarity.
Russia, for instance, scores well on certain aspects of multipolarity(e.g., militarily), but in its current state it may never become a true pole in the sense employed here.
US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has referred to the Obama administration's foreign policy as being based on“smart power”, which combines hard and soft power resources,and argued that we should not talk about“multipolarity”, but about“multi-partnerships”.
Worldwide multipolarity is already a feature of diplomacy and economics, but the South China Sea is poised to show us what multipolarity in a military sense actually looks like.
China, in particular,is interesting in the context of the switch from globalization to multipolarity, not least because at the 2017 World Economic Forum the Chinese president claimed the mantle of globalization for China.
Even if multipolarity is based on the growing dispersion and regionalization of economic power, it is also expressed in other ways, notably military power, political and cyberfreedoms, technological sophistication, financial sector growth, and a greater sense of cultural prerogative and confidence.
Norms of state behavior can come to be broadly understood and accepted by all states,even in multipolarity, just as basic norms of diplomatic conduct became generally accepted by the European powers during the eighteenth century.
There is a strong trend toward multipolarity in this diverse and vibrant area, and a unipolar Asia would represent an enormous failure of power and will on the part of the other regional actors.
Sooner or later, the historical norm of multipolarity, balance, regional hegemonies and ideological diversity will prevail in international relations, and America will have to recognize it just as it did under Woodrow Wilson, however much he opposed it.