Примеры использования To taking countermeasures на Английском языке и их переводы на Русский язык
{-}
-
Official
-
Colloquial
Prior to taking countermeasures, an injured State shall fulfil its obligation to negotiate provided for in article 54.
In such a situation, the obligation to negotiate prior to taking countermeasures would work in favour of the wrongdoing State.
In other words, codification efforts should focus on a workable procedure to be applied prior to taking countermeasures.
Paragraph 1 stipulates that, prior to taking countermeasures, an injured State must fulfil its“obligation to negotiate” with the State that has committed the wrongful act.
He hoped, too, that generally acceptable wording could be found for the provisions relating to dispute settlement procedures to be used prior to taking countermeasures.
Customary international law does not require an injured State to seek negotiations prior to taking countermeasures, nor does it prohibit the taking of countermeasures during negotiations.
We think it unlikely that, in the current decentralized system of international law, States would be willing to undertake any more wide-ranging obligation prior to taking countermeasures.
Mr. CEDE(Austria) said that the codification of a workable procedure to be applied prior to taking countermeasures should constitute the centrepiece of the codification endeavour on the topic of State responsibility.
Since that did not always seem to be the case,the inclusion in the draft articles of an obligation on the part of the injured State to negotiate prior to taking countermeasures appeared to be appropriate.
For example, article 48 required that prior to taking countermeasures, an injured State must fulfil its obligation to negotiate provided for in article 54, without stipulating how much time must be spent on such negotiations.
His delegation welcomed the fact that its point of view concerning the obligation of the injured State to attempt to settle a dispute prior to taking countermeasures had been reflected in the reformulated version of article 48, paragraph 1.
If the obligation to negotiate prior to taking countermeasures is interpreted in the latter manner, with this interpretation to be elaborated in the draft articles, the obligation to negotiate per se would not work in favour of the wrongdoing State.
Similarly, it was felt that article 48,under which an injured State was required to negotiate prior to taking countermeasures, had no basis in customary international law, unlike the demand for cessation or reparation.
France then started to exert pressure on the Dutch government to"defend its treaty rights" by selectively imposing economic sanctions on the Dutch cities that supported the stadtholder in his opposition to taking countermeasures against the British"depredations.
It was stated that article 48 required that, prior to taking countermeasures, an injured State must fulfil its obligation to negotiate provided for in article 54, without stipulating how much time must be spent on such negotiations.
Moreover, application of the classic notion of crime might destroy the fine balance of interests which must be maintained between injuring and injured State in order to give dispute settlement procedures prior to taking countermeasures a chance of being effective.
Article 53(2) requires that an injured State offer to negotiate with the breaching State prior to taking countermeasures, and article 53(4) requires that countermeasures not be undertaken while negotiations are being pursued in good faith.
Austria welcomes the fact that the point of view stated in the past by the Austrian delegation to the General Assembly concerning the obligation of the injured State to seek dispute settlement measures prior to taking countermeasures has been reflected in the reformulated article 48, paragraph 1.
Article 48, paragraph 1, provides that, prior to taking countermeasures, an injured State must fulfil its obligation to negotiate with the wrongdoing State provided for in article 54 and is not entitled to take countermeasures unless it does so.
Accordingly, his delegation could not support the provision contained in article 48 requiring an injured State to negotiate prior to taking countermeasures, a requirement which, unlike the demand for cessation or reparation, had no basis in customary international law.
With regard to taking countermeasures, his delegation had not so far identified further restrictions that would apply to international organizations as opposed to States, but would wish to revisit the questions once again after the Special Rapporteur had submitted his sixth report.
It is in this sense that the Czech Republic interprets paragraph 1,which requires the injured State to fulfil its obligation to negotiate prior to taking countermeasures, except in the case of“interim measures of protection”, the suspension of which would render the countermeasures meaningless.
This obligation should not be interpreted as meaning that negotiations must proceed substantially prior to taking countermeasures, but rather that the injured State is permitted to take countermeasures if the wrongdoing State has not made any specific response to its proposal within a reasonable period of time.
As regards instrumental consequences,the view was expressed that the use of the concept of crime as a qualifying element for determining the procedures to be followed prior to taking countermeasures, on the one hand, and for determining the quality of such measures, on the other, was problematic and was also risky, if not counter-productive, in the absence of an effective international authority which would decide when such a crime had been committed and would apply punitive measures.
Therefore, the right to take countermeasures accrues only to the injured State.
It is clear from the draft articles that States are not allowed to take countermeasures of a non-reversible nature, or in breach of obligations under peremptory norms of general international law.
The contents and the conditions to take countermeasures are a matter of the primary rule and are outside the scope of this draft.
Any right of international organizations to take countermeasures should be subject to the applicable rules of the organization, as set out in draft articles 21 and 51.
The right to take countermeasures against a breach of an international obligation that is owed to the international community as a whole is closely linked to the idea of decentralized enforcement of international law.
However, even if the entitlement of the injured State to take countermeasures was recognized, such countermeasures should be subject to certain restrictions.