Примеры использования Production ban на Английском языке и их переводы на Русский язык
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Another urgent task was the negotiation of a fissile material production ban.
With regard to the production ban treaty, I have already made my delegation's position clear in my statement yesterday, and I will not repeat it here.
I only want to recall what I said yesterday:that China supports the purposes and objectives of the production ban treaty.
As the Conference has not resumed its negotiations on a fissile material production ban, one cannot prejudge the position of my delegation concerning each particular aspect of the future treaty.
Additionally, there is no doubt that fissile material for civil use should not be subject to a production ban under an FMCT.
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As early as the beginning of 2006, Russia,under the pretext of low quality production, banned Georgian produced fruits and vegetables and then, in March the same year, prohibited Georgian mineral water and wine to enter the Russian market.
As to maiming injury,Grenada urges that all anti-personnel landmines now in existence be destroyed, and further production banned forthwith.
Among the various issues which should be addressed during the negotiations on a fissile material production ban treaty, the question of how to deal with stockpiles will be one of the most contentious.
New Zealand's view is that the report of the Canadian Special Coordinator allows for an approach which could address the concerns of all in relation to the scope of the production ban.
We have noted the importance many States attach to the early commencement of negotiations on a fissile materials production ban(“cut-off”) treaty, an objective Brazil shares and supports.
If, for example, the effective verification of a production ban required a specific tangible baseline for the cut-off, it might be necessary to provide data on the size of existing stocks, at least in an aggregate manner.
This is why we should be careful in determining under which circumstances a fissile materials production ban can in fact positively impact nuclear disarmament.
Before examining the definition of fissile materials for inclusion in an FMCT production ban, as mentioned in paragraph 12, it should be emphasized that fissile materials for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices will be banned, while materials for civil purposes will be outside the scope of such a ban. .
New Zealand shares the view that the early conclusion of a non-discriminatory, multilateral, andeffectively verifiable fissile material production ban will be of particular importance in the context of non-proliferation.
Before examining the definition of fissile materials for inclusion in an FMCT production ban, as the Ambassador stated before, it should be emphasized that fissile materials for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices will be banned, while materials for civil purposes will be outside the scope of such a ban. .
Over these past three and a half years of intensive work(1995-1996), pause and reflection(1997), andpainful gestation of a decision- the launching of the negotiations on a fissile material production ban, I have seen many faces of the Conference on Disarmament.
For this purpose,it might be constructive to examine the possibility of further obligations in addition to the production ban on fissile material for nuclear weapons(excluding"fissile material" for civil purposes), such as state accounting and control and physical protection, as well as a transfer ban on fissile material for nuclear weapon purposes.
We regard it as a significant multilateral endeavour, in which nuclear-weapon States andnon-nuclear-weapon States together try to diminish nuclear danger by agreeing on a production ban and on an international verification regime.
Issues such as how to define"production" for a production ban of fissile material for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices, or more specifically, whether to limit the scope of"production" to"future production" or to add"past production" which means to include"stockpiling" as a banned activity(in other words, imposing future reduction and elimination obligations) still remain open to debate.
Accordingly, preventing greater increases in the amounts of fissile material for nuclear weapons,as well as ensuring the irreversibility of nuclear disarmament measures by states possessing such fissile material through an FMCT production ban will be of enormous value.
It supports the reaching bythe Conference of a comprehensive and balanced programme of work so that substantive work on such issues as a production ban, preventing an arms race in outer space, nuclear disarmament and ensuring the security of non-nuclear-weapon States can begin as soon as possible.
However, in any event, whatever may be the role of declarations in the overall regimethat is developed to deal with fissile materials, the bottom line must be that the verification regime needs to be able to differentiate between stocks held at the date of entry into force of the production ban and stocks produced illegally after that date.
Moreover, considering the current importance of strengthening nuclear security, it might be worth looking at the possibility of realizing not only a production ban, but also the obligations of State accounting and control and physical protection, as well as a ban on the transfer of stocks of fissile material for nuclear weapons.
If the fissile material has been processed to the point that it no longer has any properties that could reveal weapon secrets, then bringing that material under inspection with an undertaking that it cannot be re-used for any military purpose serves two purposes:a capping the capabilities of the State(together with a production ban) and b providing a means to build confidence and thereby encouraging further arms reductions and increasing the amounts of excess material subject to inspection.
We must ban their production!
The treaty cannot ban production that has already occurred.
We will press for an international agreement that would ban production of these materials for weapons for ever.
Then we must ban the production of uranium and plutonium for nuclear weapons.
A more far-reaching treaty could ban production of fissile materials for a larger range of military purposes or even all purposes.
A treaty, in our view,should include, apart from a ban on production, a ban on transfers, acquisition and related assistance activities.