Examples of using Leniency programmes in English and their translations into Arabic
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Theory of effective leniency programmes 4.
Many leniency programmes have a" marker" system.
A handful of developing countries have anti-cartel leniency programmes.
Leniency Programmes to Fight Hard Core Cartels(2001).
Would other developing countries also benefit from instituting their own leniency programmes?
Possible areas for international cooperation included leniency programmes, merger analysis and capacity-building.
In summary, the leniency programmes in active medium-income countries form part of broader anti-cartel strategies.
A handful of medium-incomecountries have had anti-cartel and attractive leniency programmes for a few years.
In many cartel cases, leniency programmes have been instrumental in securing evidence from cartel participants.
Five middle-income countries- South Africa, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and the Russian Federation-have active leniency programmes.
The vast majority of developing countries have no leniency programmes aimed at inducing self-reporting of cartels.
But the most effective tool today for detecting cartels andobtaining the relevant evidence is leniency programmes.
Leniency programmes are designed to give incentives to cartel members to come in, confess and aid the competition law enforcers.
Among medium- and low-income countries, Brazil, Mexico, the Russian Federation and South Africa have active leniency programmes.
Only a handful of developing countries have active leniency programmes, while the vast majority of developing countries do not.
Together, these effects imply that countries benefit when othersbecome more active against cartels and adopt effective leniency programmes.
If other developing countries were to adopt leniency programmes, a political commitment to fight cartels is necessary for such a programme to be effective.
However, a point to note in this case is the need to strike abalance between rulings from ex officio investigations and leniency programmes application.
But leniency programmes are available to any cartelist(if they are first to apply or, in some programmes, second or third) on identical terms.
Many competition agencies have the power to commit not to impose sanctions,which is important for implementing leniency programmes that can provide incentives for cartel reporting.
Zambia argued that leniency programmes were necessary for better cartel detection and expressed the hope that there would be more regional commitment on that point.
It begins with a description of theexperience of five medium-income countries with active anti-cartel and leniency programmes and, more briefly, some of those with some elements in place.
While leniency programmes are the most effective cartel discovery tool today, they are only effective when paired with active search for and significant punishment of cartelists.
The experience of a handful of middle-income countries shows that, oncethe precondition of seriously fighting cartels is met, both domestic and international cartels can be detected by such countries using leniency programmes.
The(relatively few) countries whose leniency programmes are flourishing consider this tool to be the most effective in their arsenal, even more effective than dawn raids.
The recent OECD report referred to above indeed recommends thatways should be examined of coordinating leniency programmes, especially by encouraging leniency applicants to simultaneously apply in as many countries as possible.
Leniency programmes had proven to be a powerful tool for cartel detection in well-established competition law regimes, whereas only a small number of younger competition law regimes from developing countries had adopted such programmes. .
Countries with provisions dealing with anyform of cartelization should consider introducing leniency programmes as part of their regulations, while those in the process of drafting competition laws may consider developing a programme with initial implementation regulations.
It is feared that leniency programmes lose their attractiveness, and thus become less successful, if leniency applicants face massive follow-on actions for damages based upon their submissions to the competition authority and the latter ' s decision.
The following paragraphs describe how leniency programmes change cartelists ' incentives, first for a single jurisdiction and then for two jurisdictions.