Examples of using Transparency rules in English and their translations into Russian
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It keeps an open policy with its customers and applies full transparency rules.
The treaty provisions and the transparency rules would need to be interpreted by the arbitral tribunal which would apply them.
It was said that such a presumption implied that the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules be amended in order to include the transparency rules.
In response, it was said that deviation from the transparency rules would require a higher threshold than merely exercising discretion where permitted under the rules. .
The view was expressed that the underlying treaty between State parties would prevent one State party andthe investor to depart from the transparency rules.
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It was further questioned how the disputing parties could be compelled to comply with transparency rules, in instances where those rules would be contrary to the applicable law.
The notion of a"treaty providing for the protection of investments" under the rules wassaid to be an important matter, as that notion constituted the gateway for applying the transparency rules.
Views were expressed that delegations should not be forced to accept transparency rules either via a dynamic interpretation or otherwise, but that consent should always be clearly given.
Countries should give due consideration to the adequate types and amount of information about lobbyists' activities that should be subject to disclosure andintroduce respective transparency rules.
He had taken due note of the views expressed concerning the work on transparency rules in investor-State arbitration and would faithfully report back to the Working Group.
A question was raised as to how, under paragraph(4),the level of transparency would be assessed to determine which of the treaty provisions or the transparency rules would apply.
In addition, regarding future investment treaties, the transparency rules would apply if such treaties contained a reference to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, unless the Parties to the treaty agreed otherwise.
Secondly, the report should reflect the fact that there had been discussion as to whether the right of a non-disputing State to participate arose from the transparency rules or from a right under the treaty.
First, the Commission should not give Working Group I the impression that it was presuming that the transparency rules should give non-disputing parties the right to participate; there was no intention of pre-empting the outcome.
While it had been agreed that there would be no expectation that States would or should use the mechanism offered by such a convention and that they should not be pressured to do so,any application of the transparency rules to existing treaties would raise serious issues.
In that light, it was suggested that the Working Group should consider whether specific transparency rules for appointment of arbitrators should be defined, in particular when appointment was made by appointing authorities.
This section of the Annual Report hasbeen prepared in compliance with the requirements of the FSA's(Financial Services Authority) Disclosure and Transparency Rules(DTR 7.2) Corporate Governance Statements.
It was also questioned how the transparency rules would operate in connection with article 1(3) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules(as revised in 2010), which provided that the mandatory provisions of the applicable law prevailed.
However, the question remained whether there was a need to include a provision to deal with that issue in the transparency rules, as that was a matter of treaty interpretation, not necessarily a matter to be addressed in rules. .
For existing investment treaties, the rules on transparency would only apply where the parties had expressly consented thereto,with wording being used to make it clear that there could be no dynamic interpretation of existing investment treaties which would make the transparency rules applicable to them.
Further, it was said that, in order to ensure application of the transparency rules to existing investment treaties, it might be necessary to include a reference to the transparency rules in the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. .
It was also noted that some delegations had expressed the concern that it might be difficult to exclude the possibility of any dynamic interpretation(as was sought to be done) if the transparency rules were presented as an appendix to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. .
It was said that the presumption in paragraph(2) that the transparency rules would apply when the investment treaty contained a reference to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules raised questions as to the form that the transparency rules would take.
The Chair proposed that, in its report, the Commission should support the work of the Working Group; express appreciation for the work of the secretariat; and request the Working Group to pursue its efforts andproduce a text on transparency rules for consideration by the Commission at its next session.
A few delegations still opposed to combine the transparency rules with the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, and insisted that stand-alonerules would guarantee Parties conscious and explicit consent to the rules on transparency. .
A contrary view expressed was that the disputing parties could, as a matter of law, always amend their arbitration agreements(including the reference to the transparency rules contained therein) and that it was accordingly not possible to entrench non-derogable provisions in the transparency rules.
It was suggested that the question of the form the transparency rules would take, i.e., stand-alone rules or appendix to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, should be considered before undertaking work premised on the rules on transparency being incorporated into the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, as a first and separate issue.
Ms. Kobayashi-Terada(Japan) drew attention to her country's comment in document A/CN.9/787/Add.1/Corr.1in which it had proposed a revised version of the first footnote which ensured that the transparency rules also applied to international agreements to which Hong Kong and Macao were parties.
Views were expressed in favour of option 2, variant 2 on the basis that transparency rules should be drafted in line with the fundamental principle of public international law that States Parties to investment treaties should not be bound unless they explicitly consented in the investment treaty.
At its fifty-seventh session,the Working Group had expressed significant support for the principle that the default rule would remain that hearings would be public under the transparency rules, subject only to the exceptions in paragraphs(2) and(3) A/CN.9/760, para. 82.